Text-overlap comparison
1 candidate passage (embedding cosine similarity 0.90–0.90) identified this pair for review. The exhibits below are near-verbatim word-shingle matches instead — a multi-word verbatim run is the more convincing evidence of shared text than embedding similarity, with the matched span highlighted.
PAPER A
PAPER B
EARLIER¶7-11
3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. 4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. 181 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 However, in spite of their growing numbers and seeming popularity, especially since the return of democracy in 1999, issues are constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing, against the background of their penchants for wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings (see Amnesty International, 2002; HRW/ CLEEN, 2002). To this end, there have been increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. In addition, in contemporary times the country is battling its worst level of insecurity since the civil war, which ended in 1970. It is against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Nigeria’s policing environment since the return of democracy in 1999. What have been their roles in post-authoritarian Nigeria? In discharging these roles, have they really constituted themselves as security threats to the country fledgling democracy? Specifically, this article engages these questions within the framework of the objective of the study. In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study’s purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country’s security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions. Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing,
LATER¶0-4
International Journal of Law and Societal Studies ISSN: 3079-2614 DOI: 10.61424/ijlss Journal Homepage: www.bluemarkpublishers.com/index.php/IJLSS IJLSS BLUEMARK PUBLISHERS Copyright: © 2025 the Author(s). This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Published by Bluemark Publishers. 2Legal Practitioner, Nigeria Corresponding Author: Ubongabasi Israel PhD, E-mail: kolinx2013@gmail.com | ABSTRACT The rise in crime and insecurity in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999, led to the proliferation of several non-state armed groups like Vigilante Groups of Nigeria, among others In spite of this development, however, issues and concerns were constantly being raised about them regarding whether they could really be agents of policing against the backdrop of their penchant for human rights violations and extra-judicial killings. It is against this background that this article examines the role of vigilante groups in policing Akwa Ibom State. Using a content analysis method, and drawing information from both primary and secondary sources, the research observed that the activities of vigilante groups between 1987 and 1999 were not guided by a body of law nor did it conform to the principles of rule of law and constitutionalism, hence their services were not accepted by the general public in Akwa Ibom State. The paper concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remained the instruments of intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them; the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of dejection; hence the need to set up a body of law that guards the conduct of Vigilantism and activities of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State. | KEYWORDS Vigilantism, Police, Policing, Community Policing, Security, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria | ARTICLE INFORMATION ACCEPTED: 13 October 2025 PUBLISHED: 27 November 2025 DOI: 10.61424/ijlss.v2.i2.576 1. Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. For instance, Ekpo and several other age-grade groups were responsible for the policing of pre-colonial Ibibio society. With the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had existed for centuries were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony.1 With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had existed for centuries and been part of the people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing, rendering subsidiary roles.
EARLIER¶53-57
Operationally, like most indigenous-oriented groups, steeped in spiritualism and fetishism, OPC deploys traditional occultism to fighting crime. For instance, members of the group often consult oracle to determine the future on any particular course of action (see Adebanwi, 2005). Also, members of the group wear black clothing and often speak in coded languages which cannot be deciphered by those outside the group (Owumi, 2013,78). According to Human Rights Watch (2003), ‘members of OPC were often kitted with occult, ‘insurance cover’ by incisions, gbere, on their bodies with charms. This emboldened them in the discharge of their vigilante duties’. Notwithstanding these, the group, especially, in the first few years of the country’s return to democracy, gained so much popularity and acceptability among the people of the southwest. Indeed, in major cities in the region, the group, because of its audacity to venture into the dens of criminals which the police for years dared not to venture into, became the courted bride of the people (Ajayi; Aderinto, 2008, 2012). As Babawale (2003, 62) notes, ‘the OPC in the southwest literally became a parallel security outfit with its involvement in vigilante services and its running battle with criminal gangs’. However, like the Bakassi Boys, examined earlier, OPC, in discharging vigilante services, engaged in activities, that most times, threatened public order. It clear from the foregoing discussions that the activities of vigilante groups in democratizing societies could be anti-social and as such could have implications on the country’s security environment. Vigilante Groups and National (In)security in Post-Authoritarian Nigeria In the contemporary mass society, no country, due to a combination of factors, is able to fight crime effectively only through public policing without the supports of sub-state actors. But, in liberal jurisdictions, while vigilante groups often operate within the perimeter of rule of law and constitutionalism, their counterparts in illiberal democracies, as the case of the post-Authoritarian Nigeria being examined in this study will soon show, tend to operate in manner that do not only put question mark on the entire concept of vigilantism but also constitutive threats to social stability and by extension, the security of the society (see Oronsaye; Igbafe, 2012). 192 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199
LATER¶0-4
International Journal of Law and Societal Studies ISSN: 3079-2614 DOI: 10.61424/ijlss Journal Homepage: www.bluemarkpublishers.com/index.php/IJLSS IJLSS BLUEMARK PUBLISHERS Copyright: © 2025 the Author(s). This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Published by Bluemark Publishers. 2Legal Practitioner, Nigeria Corresponding Author: Ubongabasi Israel PhD, E-mail: kolinx2013@gmail.com | ABSTRACT The rise in crime and insecurity in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999, led to the proliferation of several non-state armed groups like Vigilante Groups of Nigeria, among others In spite of this development, however, issues and concerns were constantly being raised about them regarding whether they could really be agents of policing against the backdrop of their penchant for human rights violations and extra-judicial killings. It is against this background that this article examines the role of vigilante groups in policing Akwa Ibom State. Using a content analysis method, and drawing information from both primary and secondary sources, the research observed that the activities of vigilante groups between 1987 and 1999 were not guided by a body of law nor did it conform to the principles of rule of law and constitutionalism, hence their services were not accepted by the general public in Akwa Ibom State. The paper concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remained the instruments of intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them; the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of dejection; hence the need to set up a body of law that guards the conduct of Vigilantism and activities of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State. | KEYWORDS Vigilantism, Police, Policing, Community Policing, Security, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria | ARTICLE INFORMATION ACCEPTED: 13 October 2025 PUBLISHED: 27 November 2025 DOI: 10.61424/ijlss.v2.i2.576 1. Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. For instance, Ekpo and several other age-grade groups were responsible for the policing of pre-colonial Ibibio society. With the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had existed for centuries were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony.1 With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had existed for centuries and been part of the people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing, rendering subsidiary roles.
EARLIER¶64-66
194 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 created by the government. For example, in an operation carried out by OPC to flush out pipeline vandals, around Arepo area, in Ogun State, Southwest Nigeria in early 2015, aside from not achieving the intended objectives, led to loss of innocent lives and destruction of properties. Conclusions This article set out to examine the character of vigilante groups in a democratizing Nigeria against the backdrop of the contradictory views about their roles. In furtherance of this objective, it clarified key concepts relevant to the discourse, examined extant literature on vigilantism and vigilante groups in Nigeria and assesses the balance sheet of vigilante groups in a democratizing Nigeria. From these reviews and analyses, it found that the character of vigilantism and vigilante groups in Nigeria is markedly different from those in liberal jurisdictions. It also notes that unlike the practice in liberal democracies where vigilante groups, in conduct and practice, conform to principles of rule of law and constitutionalism; the opposite, going by the activities of some militant vigilantes since the return of democracy, is the case. This state of affair has impacted negatively on the country’s security environment. In the light of these, it argues and concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remain the instruments of political intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them, the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of ‘anocracy’.
LATER¶0-4
International Journal of Law and Societal Studies ISSN: 3079-2614 DOI: 10.61424/ijlss Journal Homepage: www.bluemarkpublishers.com/index.php/IJLSS IJLSS BLUEMARK PUBLISHERS Copyright: © 2025 the Author(s). This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Published by Bluemark Publishers. 2Legal Practitioner, Nigeria Corresponding Author: Ubongabasi Israel PhD, E-mail: kolinx2013@gmail.com | ABSTRACT The rise in crime and insecurity in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999, led to the proliferation of several non-state armed groups like Vigilante Groups of Nigeria, among others In spite of this development, however, issues and concerns were constantly being raised about them regarding whether they could really be agents of policing against the backdrop of their penchant for human rights violations and extra-judicial killings. It is against this background that this article examines the role of vigilante groups in policing Akwa Ibom State. Using a content analysis method, and drawing information from both primary and secondary sources, the research observed that the activities of vigilante groups between 1987 and 1999 were not guided by a body of law nor did it conform to the principles of rule of law and constitutionalism, hence their services were not accepted by the general public in Akwa Ibom State. The paper concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remained the instruments of intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them; the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of dejection; hence the need to set up a body of law that guards the conduct of Vigilantism and activities of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State. | KEYWORDS Vigilantism, Police, Policing, Community Policing, Security, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria | ARTICLE INFORMATION ACCEPTED: 13 October 2025 PUBLISHED: 27 November 2025 DOI: 10.61424/ijlss.v2.i2.576 1. Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. For instance, Ekpo and several other age-grade groups were responsible for the policing of pre-colonial Ibibio society. With the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had existed for centuries were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony.1 With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had existed for centuries and been part of the people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing, rendering subsidiary roles.
EARLIER¶54-58
Notwithstanding these, the group, especially, in the first few years of the country’s return to democracy, gained so much popularity and acceptability among the people of the southwest. Indeed, in major cities in the region, the group, because of its audacity to venture into the dens of criminals which the police for years dared not to venture into, became the courted bride of the people (Ajayi; Aderinto, 2008, 2012). As Babawale (2003, 62) notes, ‘the OPC in the southwest literally became a parallel security outfit with its involvement in vigilante services and its running battle with criminal gangs’. However, like the Bakassi Boys, examined earlier, OPC, in discharging vigilante services, engaged in activities, that most times, threatened public order. It clear from the foregoing discussions that the activities of vigilante groups in democratizing societies could be anti-social and as such could have implications on the country’s security environment. Vigilante Groups and National (In)security in Post-Authoritarian Nigeria In the contemporary mass society, no country, due to a combination of factors, is able to fight crime effectively only through public policing without the supports of sub-state actors. But, in liberal jurisdictions, while vigilante groups often operate within the perimeter of rule of law and constitutionalism, their counterparts in illiberal democracies, as the case of the post-Authoritarian Nigeria being examined in this study will soon show, tend to operate in manner that do not only put question mark on the entire concept of vigilantism but also constitutive threats to social stability and by extension, the security of the society (see Oronsaye; Igbafe, 2012). 192 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 Although, it has to be stressed that while some vigilante groups, especially, those organized as neighborhood watches, in major cities, across the country, have to a reasonable degree, tended to mimic vigilantism in liberal jurisdictions, most vigilante groups, in Nigeria, especially those that arose in the atmosphere of what Lumumba-Kasongo (1995, 409) referred to as ‘anger’, ‘conflict’ and ‘irrationality’, in the last few years, have been antithetical to established norms of vigilantism and by implications, constitute threats to social stability. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, most vigilante groups in contemporary Nigeria hardly operate in conjunction with the police as is the situation in matured democracies. Even where the vigilante groups are mandated by law to work with the police, in dealing with suspects, most of them rather than working with the police, would still resort to self-help measures. In Anambra State, for example, the law that gave legality to the activities of the Bakassi Boys, states that the vigilante group shall augment the maintenance of security in their various community and shall in particular render all lawful help and assistance to the police in the sphere of crime prevention and detection (ANSG, 2000).
LATER¶0-4
International Journal of Law and Societal Studies ISSN: 3079-2614 DOI: 10.61424/ijlss Journal Homepage: www.bluemarkpublishers.com/index.php/IJLSS IJLSS BLUEMARK PUBLISHERS Copyright: © 2025 the Author(s). This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Published by Bluemark Publishers. 2Legal Practitioner, Nigeria Corresponding Author: Ubongabasi Israel PhD, E-mail: kolinx2013@gmail.com | ABSTRACT The rise in crime and insecurity in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999, led to the proliferation of several non-state armed groups like Vigilante Groups of Nigeria, among others In spite of this development, however, issues and concerns were constantly being raised about them regarding whether they could really be agents of policing against the backdrop of their penchant for human rights violations and extra-judicial killings. It is against this background that this article examines the role of vigilante groups in policing Akwa Ibom State. Using a content analysis method, and drawing information from both primary and secondary sources, the research observed that the activities of vigilante groups between 1987 and 1999 were not guided by a body of law nor did it conform to the principles of rule of law and constitutionalism, hence their services were not accepted by the general public in Akwa Ibom State. The paper concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remained the instruments of intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them; the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of dejection; hence the need to set up a body of law that guards the conduct of Vigilantism and activities of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State. | KEYWORDS Vigilantism, Police, Policing, Community Policing, Security, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria | ARTICLE INFORMATION ACCEPTED: 13 October 2025 PUBLISHED: 27 November 2025 DOI: 10.61424/ijlss.v2.i2.576 1. Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. For instance, Ekpo and several other age-grade groups were responsible for the policing of pre-colonial Ibibio society. With the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had existed for centuries were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony.1 With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had existed for centuries and been part of the people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing, rendering subsidiary roles.
EARLIER¶64-66
194 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 created by the government. For example, in an operation carried out by OPC to flush out pipeline vandals, around Arepo area, in Ogun State, Southwest Nigeria in early 2015, aside from not achieving the intended objectives, led to loss of innocent lives and destruction of properties. Conclusions This article set out to examine the character of vigilante groups in a democratizing Nigeria against the backdrop of the contradictory views about their roles. In furtherance of this objective, it clarified key concepts relevant to the discourse, examined extant literature on vigilantism and vigilante groups in Nigeria and assesses the balance sheet of vigilante groups in a democratizing Nigeria. From these reviews and analyses, it found that the character of vigilantism and vigilante groups in Nigeria is markedly different from those in liberal jurisdictions. It also notes that unlike the practice in liberal democracies where vigilante groups, in conduct and practice, conform to principles of rule of law and constitutionalism; the opposite, going by the activities of some militant vigilantes since the return of democracy, is the case. This state of affair has impacted negatively on the country’s security environment. In the light of these, it argues and concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remain the instruments of political intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them, the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of ‘anocracy’.
LATER¶0-4
International Journal of Law and Societal Studies ISSN: 3079-2614 DOI: 10.61424/ijlss Journal Homepage: www.bluemarkpublishers.com/index.php/IJLSS IJLSS BLUEMARK PUBLISHERS Copyright: © 2025 the Author(s). This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Published by Bluemark Publishers. 2Legal Practitioner, Nigeria Corresponding Author: Ubongabasi Israel PhD, E-mail: kolinx2013@gmail.com | ABSTRACT The rise in crime and insecurity in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999, led to the proliferation of several non-state armed groups like Vigilante Groups of Nigeria, among others In spite of this development, however, issues and concerns were constantly being raised about them regarding whether they could really be agents of policing against the backdrop of their penchant for human rights violations and extra-judicial killings. It is against this background that this article examines the role of vigilante groups in policing Akwa Ibom State. Using a content analysis method, and drawing information from both primary and secondary sources, the research observed that the activities of vigilante groups between 1987 and 1999 were not guided by a body of law nor did it conform to the principles of rule of law and constitutionalism, hence their services were not accepted by the general public in Akwa Ibom State. The paper concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remained the instruments of intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them; the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of dejection; hence the need to set up a body of law that guards the conduct of Vigilantism and activities of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State. | KEYWORDS Vigilantism, Police, Policing, Community Policing, Security, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria | ARTICLE INFORMATION ACCEPTED: 13 October 2025 PUBLISHED: 27 November 2025 DOI: 10.61424/ijlss.v2.i2.576 1. Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. For instance, Ekpo and several other age-grade groups were responsible for the policing of pre-colonial Ibibio society. With the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had existed for centuries were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony.1 With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had existed for centuries and been part of the people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing, rendering subsidiary roles.
EARLIER¶0-3
179 Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 VIGILANTE GROUPS AND POLICING IN A DEMOCRATIZING NIGERIA: NAVIGATING THE CONTEXT AND ISSUES Adeniyi S. Basiru1 Olusesan A. Osunkoya2 Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. But, with the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had for centuries served the people, were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony (Ahire, 1991, 18). With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had for centuries been part of people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing rendering subsidiary roles. For decades, this was the arrangement for policing the vast Nigerian territory. Although, there were documented cases of police re-organizations, by the colonial authorities, in Lagos, in 1930 and 1954 (Akuul, 2011, 18), these, however, neither reversed the western-dominated order of policing nor re-organized the indigenous informal models of policing. Put differently, the indigenous police institutions, in differently parts of the country, continued to play subsidiary roles in public order management. Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement rather than being transformed to reflect 1 Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria. E-mail: asbash72@ yahoo.com 2 Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijagun, Nigeria. E-mail: osunkoyaoa@tasued.edu.ng
LATER¶2-6
2Legal Practitioner, Nigeria Corresponding Author: Ubongabasi Israel PhD, E-mail: kolinx2013@gmail.com | ABSTRACT The rise in crime and insecurity in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999, led to the proliferation of several non-state armed groups like Vigilante Groups of Nigeria, among others In spite of this development, however, issues and concerns were constantly being raised about them regarding whether they could really be agents of policing against the backdrop of their penchant for human rights violations and extra-judicial killings. It is against this background that this article examines the role of vigilante groups in policing Akwa Ibom State. Using a content analysis method, and drawing information from both primary and secondary sources, the research observed that the activities of vigilante groups between 1987 and 1999 were not guided by a body of law nor did it conform to the principles of rule of law and constitutionalism, hence their services were not accepted by the general public in Akwa Ibom State. The paper concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remained the instruments of intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them; the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of dejection; hence the need to set up a body of law that guards the conduct of Vigilantism and activities of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State. | KEYWORDS Vigilantism, Police, Policing, Community Policing, Security, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria | ARTICLE INFORMATION ACCEPTED: 13 October 2025 PUBLISHED: 27 November 2025 DOI: 10.61424/ijlss.v2.i2.576 1. Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. For instance, Ekpo and several other age-grade groups were responsible for the policing of pre-colonial Ibibio society. With the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had existed for centuries were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony.1 With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had existed for centuries and been part of the people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing, rendering subsidiary roles. 1P. T. Ahire, Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria.(Philadelphia: Open University Press,1991) p. 18 Vigilantism and Policing In Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, 1987 – 1999 Page | 22 Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement, rather than being transformed to reflect the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites.2 As the country evolved politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it was confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which posed serious threats to its survival.3 Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, appeared less than optimal. This circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country.4
EARLIER¶0-3
179 Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 VIGILANTE GROUPS AND POLICING IN A DEMOCRATIZING NIGERIA: NAVIGATING THE CONTEXT AND ISSUES Adeniyi S. Basiru1 Olusesan A. Osunkoya2 Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. But, with the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had for centuries served the people, were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony (Ahire, 1991, 18). With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had for centuries been part of people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing rendering subsidiary roles. For decades, this was the arrangement for policing the vast Nigerian territory. Although, there were documented cases of police re-organizations, by the colonial authorities, in Lagos, in 1930 and 1954 (Akuul, 2011, 18), these, however, neither reversed the western-dominated order of policing nor re-organized the indigenous informal models of policing. Put differently, the indigenous police institutions, in differently parts of the country, continued to play subsidiary roles in public order management. Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement rather than being transformed to reflect 1 Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria. E-mail: asbash72@ yahoo.com 2 Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijagun, Nigeria. E-mail: osunkoyaoa@tasued.edu.ng
LATER¶2-6
2Legal Practitioner, Nigeria Corresponding Author: Ubongabasi Israel PhD, E-mail: kolinx2013@gmail.com | ABSTRACT The rise in crime and insecurity in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999, led to the proliferation of several non-state armed groups like Vigilante Groups of Nigeria, among others In spite of this development, however, issues and concerns were constantly being raised about them regarding whether they could really be agents of policing against the backdrop of their penchant for human rights violations and extra-judicial killings. It is against this background that this article examines the role of vigilante groups in policing Akwa Ibom State. Using a content analysis method, and drawing information from both primary and secondary sources, the research observed that the activities of vigilante groups between 1987 and 1999 were not guided by a body of law nor did it conform to the principles of rule of law and constitutionalism, hence their services were not accepted by the general public in Akwa Ibom State. The paper concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remained the instruments of intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them; the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of dejection; hence the need to set up a body of law that guards the conduct of Vigilantism and activities of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State. | KEYWORDS Vigilantism, Police, Policing, Community Policing, Security, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria | ARTICLE INFORMATION ACCEPTED: 13 October 2025 PUBLISHED: 27 November 2025 DOI: 10.61424/ijlss.v2.i2.576 1. Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. For instance, Ekpo and several other age-grade groups were responsible for the policing of pre-colonial Ibibio society. With the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had existed for centuries were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony.1 With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had existed for centuries and been part of the people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing, rendering subsidiary roles. 1P. T. Ahire, Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria.(Philadelphia: Open University Press,1991) p. 18 Vigilantism and Policing In Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, 1987 – 1999 Page | 22 Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement, rather than being transformed to reflect the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites.2 As the country evolved politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it was confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which posed serious threats to its survival.3 Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, appeared less than optimal. This circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country.4
EARLIER¶0-4
179 Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 VIGILANTE GROUPS AND POLICING IN A DEMOCRATIZING NIGERIA: NAVIGATING THE CONTEXT AND ISSUES Adeniyi S. Basiru1 Olusesan A. Osunkoya2 Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. But, with the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had for centuries served the people, were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony (Ahire, 1991, 18). With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had for centuries been part of people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing rendering subsidiary roles. For decades, this was the arrangement for policing the vast Nigerian territory. Although, there were documented cases of police re-organizations, by the colonial authorities, in Lagos, in 1930 and 1954 (Akuul, 2011, 18), these, however, neither reversed the western-dominated order of policing nor re-organized the indigenous informal models of policing. Put differently, the indigenous police institutions, in differently parts of the country, continued to play subsidiary roles in public order management. Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement rather than being transformed to reflect 1 Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria. E-mail: asbash72@ yahoo.com 2 Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijagun, Nigeria. E-mail: osunkoyaoa@tasued.edu.ng 180 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199
LATER¶4-8
1. Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. For instance, Ekpo and several other age-grade groups were responsible for the policing of pre-colonial Ibibio society. With the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had existed for centuries were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony.1 With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had existed for centuries and been part of the people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing, rendering subsidiary roles. 1P. T. Ahire, Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria.(Philadelphia: Open University Press,1991) p. 18 Vigilantism and Policing In Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, 1987 – 1999 Page | 22 Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement, rather than being transformed to reflect the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites.2 As the country evolved politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it was confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which posed serious threats to its survival.3 Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, appeared less than optimal. This circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country.4 Moreover, the environment of public policing in the country, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seemed not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes and violence, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation.5More worrisomely was the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years by the Federal Government towards salvaging public policing in the country.6 At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force.7 In spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continued to fester.8 Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management appeared to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups, militia and neighbourhood watch of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country.9In Nigeria, the issue seemed no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence.10 Indeed, for many years, it appeared that many state governments did not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states.11 However, in spite of their growing numbers (after the Nigeria Civil War) and seeming popularity, issues were constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of state policing, against the background of their penchants for lawlessness, wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings.12 To this end, there was increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security, not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. Against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999.
EARLIER¶3-8
1 Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria. E-mail: asbash72@ yahoo.com 2 Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijagun, Nigeria. E-mail: osunkoyaoa@tasued.edu.ng 180 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites (Chukwuma, 1998, 26). However, as the country evolves politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it has also been confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which have posed serious threats to its survival (Otto; Ukpere, 2012, 52). Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, would appear to have been less than optimal. Perhaps, this circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country (Wisler; Onwudiwe, 2005, 13). Yet, the environment of public policing in the country, in the last few years, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seems not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation (Alemika;Chukwuma, 2004, 14). More worrisomely is the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years, by the Federal Government, towards salvaging public policing in the country (Jemibewon, 2003, 13).At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force3. Even in spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continue to fester (Adebakin and Raimi, 2012, 8). Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management would appear to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country (see Baker, 2002; Higazi, 2008; Adamu, 2008). In contemporary Nigeria, the issue seems no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence (Kwaja, 2014, 5). Indeed, in the last few years, it is an incontrovertible fact that many state governments have not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states4. 3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. 4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups.
LATER¶4-9
1. Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. For instance, Ekpo and several other age-grade groups were responsible for the policing of pre-colonial Ibibio society. With the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had existed for centuries were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony.1 With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had existed for centuries and been part of the people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing, rendering subsidiary roles. 1P. T. Ahire, Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria.(Philadelphia: Open University Press,1991) p. 18 Vigilantism and Policing In Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, 1987 – 1999 Page | 22 Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement, rather than being transformed to reflect the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites.2 As the country evolved politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it was confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which posed serious threats to its survival.3 Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, appeared less than optimal. This circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country.4 Moreover, the environment of public policing in the country, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seemed not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes and violence, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation.5More worrisomely was the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years by the Federal Government towards salvaging public policing in the country.6 At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force.7 In spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continued to fester.8 Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management appeared to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups, militia and neighbourhood watch of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country.9In Nigeria, the issue seemed no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence.10 Indeed, for many years, it appeared that many state governments did not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states.11 However, in spite of their growing numbers (after the Nigeria Civil War) and seeming popularity, issues were constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of state policing, against the background of their penchants for lawlessness, wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings.12 To this end, there was increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security, not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. Against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999. 2I.Chukwuma,“Police Powers and Human Rights in Nigeria,”Law Enforcement Review. Lagos,(1998), p.26. 3G. Otto and W. I. Upkere, “National Security and Development in Nigeria” African Journal of Business Management, Volume 6, No. 23 (2012), p. 6765-6770.
EARLIER¶4-8
180 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites (Chukwuma, 1998, 26). However, as the country evolves politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it has also been confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which have posed serious threats to its survival (Otto; Ukpere, 2012, 52). Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, would appear to have been less than optimal. Perhaps, this circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country (Wisler; Onwudiwe, 2005, 13). Yet, the environment of public policing in the country, in the last few years, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seems not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation (Alemika;Chukwuma, 2004, 14). More worrisomely is the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years, by the Federal Government, towards salvaging public policing in the country (Jemibewon, 2003, 13).At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force3. Even in spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continue to fester (Adebakin and Raimi, 2012, 8). Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management would appear to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country (see Baker, 2002; Higazi, 2008; Adamu, 2008). In contemporary Nigeria, the issue seems no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence (Kwaja, 2014, 5). Indeed, in the last few years, it is an incontrovertible fact that many state governments have not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states4. 3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. 4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups.
LATER¶5-9
1P. T. Ahire, Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria.(Philadelphia: Open University Press,1991) p. 18 Vigilantism and Policing In Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, 1987 – 1999 Page | 22 Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement, rather than being transformed to reflect the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites.2 As the country evolved politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it was confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which posed serious threats to its survival.3 Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, appeared less than optimal. This circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country.4 Moreover, the environment of public policing in the country, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seemed not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes and violence, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation.5More worrisomely was the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years by the Federal Government towards salvaging public policing in the country.6 At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force.7 In spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continued to fester.8 Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management appeared to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups, militia and neighbourhood watch of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country.9In Nigeria, the issue seemed no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence.10 Indeed, for many years, it appeared that many state governments did not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states.11 However, in spite of their growing numbers (after the Nigeria Civil War) and seeming popularity, issues were constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of state policing, against the background of their penchants for lawlessness, wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings.12 To this end, there was increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security, not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. Against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999. 2I.Chukwuma,“Police Powers and Human Rights in Nigeria,”Law Enforcement Review. Lagos,(1998), p.26. 3G. Otto and W. I. Upkere, “National Security and Development in Nigeria” African Journal of Business Management, Volume 6, No. 23 (2012), p. 6765-6770.
EARLIER¶4-8
180 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites (Chukwuma, 1998, 26). However, as the country evolves politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it has also been confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which have posed serious threats to its survival (Otto; Ukpere, 2012, 52). Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, would appear to have been less than optimal. Perhaps, this circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country (Wisler; Onwudiwe, 2005, 13). Yet, the environment of public policing in the country, in the last few years, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seems not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation (Alemika;Chukwuma, 2004, 14). More worrisomely is the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years, by the Federal Government, towards salvaging public policing in the country (Jemibewon, 2003, 13).At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force3. Even in spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continue to fester (Adebakin and Raimi, 2012, 8). Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management would appear to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country (see Baker, 2002; Higazi, 2008; Adamu, 2008). In contemporary Nigeria, the issue seems no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence (Kwaja, 2014, 5). Indeed, in the last few years, it is an incontrovertible fact that many state governments have not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states4. 3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. 4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups.
LATER¶5-9
1P. T. Ahire, Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria.(Philadelphia: Open University Press,1991) p. 18 Vigilantism and Policing In Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, 1987 – 1999 Page | 22 Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement, rather than being transformed to reflect the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites.2 As the country evolved politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it was confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which posed serious threats to its survival.3 Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, appeared less than optimal. This circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country.4 Moreover, the environment of public policing in the country, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seemed not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes and violence, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation.5More worrisomely was the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years by the Federal Government towards salvaging public policing in the country.6 At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force.7 In spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continued to fester.8 Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management appeared to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups, militia and neighbourhood watch of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country.9In Nigeria, the issue seemed no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence.10 Indeed, for many years, it appeared that many state governments did not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states.11 However, in spite of their growing numbers (after the Nigeria Civil War) and seeming popularity, issues were constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of state policing, against the background of their penchants for lawlessness, wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings.12 To this end, there was increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security, not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. Against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999. 2I.Chukwuma,“Police Powers and Human Rights in Nigeria,”Law Enforcement Review. Lagos,(1998), p.26. 3G. Otto and W. I. Upkere, “National Security and Development in Nigeria” African Journal of Business Management, Volume 6, No. 23 (2012), p. 6765-6770.
EARLIER¶7-11
3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. 4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. 181 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 However, in spite of their growing numbers and seeming popularity, especially since the return of democracy in 1999, issues are constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing, against the background of their penchants for wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings (see Amnesty International, 2002; HRW/ CLEEN, 2002). To this end, there have been increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. In addition, in contemporary times the country is battling its worst level of insecurity since the civil war, which ended in 1970. It is against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Nigeria’s policing environment since the return of democracy in 1999. What have been their roles in post-authoritarian Nigeria? In discharging these roles, have they really constituted themselves as security threats to the country fledgling democracy? Specifically, this article engages these questions within the framework of the objective of the study. In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study’s purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country’s security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions. Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing,
LATER¶6-10
Page | 22 Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement, rather than being transformed to reflect the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites.2 As the country evolved politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it was confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which posed serious threats to its survival.3 Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, appeared less than optimal. This circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country.4 Moreover, the environment of public policing in the country, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seemed not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes and violence, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation.5More worrisomely was the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years by the Federal Government towards salvaging public policing in the country.6 At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force.7 In spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continued to fester.8 Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management appeared to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups, militia and neighbourhood watch of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country.9In Nigeria, the issue seemed no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence.10 Indeed, for many years, it appeared that many state governments did not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states.11 However, in spite of their growing numbers (after the Nigeria Civil War) and seeming popularity, issues were constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of state policing, against the background of their penchants for lawlessness, wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings.12 To this end, there was increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security, not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. Against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999. 2I.Chukwuma,“Police Powers and Human Rights in Nigeria,”Law Enforcement Review. Lagos,(1998), p.26. 3G. Otto and W. I. Upkere, “National Security and Development in Nigeria” African Journal of Business Management, Volume 6, No. 23 (2012), p. 6765-6770. 4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13
EARLIER¶7-11
3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. 4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. 181 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 However, in spite of their growing numbers and seeming popularity, especially since the return of democracy in 1999, issues are constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing, against the background of their penchants for wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings (see Amnesty International, 2002; HRW/ CLEEN, 2002). To this end, there have been increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. In addition, in contemporary times the country is battling its worst level of insecurity since the civil war, which ended in 1970. It is against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Nigeria’s policing environment since the return of democracy in 1999. What have been their roles in post-authoritarian Nigeria? In discharging these roles, have they really constituted themselves as security threats to the country fledgling democracy? Specifically, this article engages these questions within the framework of the objective of the study. In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study’s purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country’s security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions. Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing,
LATER¶6-10
Page | 22 Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement, rather than being transformed to reflect the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites.2 As the country evolved politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it was confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which posed serious threats to its survival.3 Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, appeared less than optimal. This circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country.4 Moreover, the environment of public policing in the country, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seemed not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes and violence, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation.5More worrisomely was the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years by the Federal Government towards salvaging public policing in the country.6 At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force.7 In spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continued to fester.8 Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management appeared to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups, militia and neighbourhood watch of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country.9In Nigeria, the issue seemed no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence.10 Indeed, for many years, it appeared that many state governments did not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states.11 However, in spite of their growing numbers (after the Nigeria Civil War) and seeming popularity, issues were constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of state policing, against the background of their penchants for lawlessness, wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings.12 To this end, there was increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security, not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. Against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999. 2I.Chukwuma,“Police Powers and Human Rights in Nigeria,”Law Enforcement Review. Lagos,(1998), p.26. 3G. Otto and W. I. Upkere, “National Security and Development in Nigeria” African Journal of Business Management, Volume 6, No. 23 (2012), p. 6765-6770. 4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13
EARLIER¶7-11
3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. 4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. 181 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 However, in spite of their growing numbers and seeming popularity, especially since the return of democracy in 1999, issues are constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing, against the background of their penchants for wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings (see Amnesty International, 2002; HRW/ CLEEN, 2002). To this end, there have been increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. In addition, in contemporary times the country is battling its worst level of insecurity since the civil war, which ended in 1970. It is against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Nigeria’s policing environment since the return of democracy in 1999. What have been their roles in post-authoritarian Nigeria? In discharging these roles, have they really constituted themselves as security threats to the country fledgling democracy? Specifically, this article engages these questions within the framework of the objective of the study. In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study’s purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country’s security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions. Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing,
LATER¶6-10
Page | 22 Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement, rather than being transformed to reflect the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites.2 As the country evolved politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it was confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which posed serious threats to its survival.3 Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, appeared less than optimal. This circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country.4 Moreover, the environment of public policing in the country, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seemed not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes and violence, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation.5More worrisomely was the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years by the Federal Government towards salvaging public policing in the country.6 At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force.7 In spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continued to fester.8 Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management appeared to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups, militia and neighbourhood watch of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country.9In Nigeria, the issue seemed no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence.10 Indeed, for many years, it appeared that many state governments did not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states.11 However, in spite of their growing numbers (after the Nigeria Civil War) and seeming popularity, issues were constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of state policing, against the background of their penchants for lawlessness, wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings.12 To this end, there was increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security, not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. Against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State from 1987 to 1999. 2I.Chukwuma,“Police Powers and Human Rights in Nigeria,”Law Enforcement Review. Lagos,(1998), p.26. 3G. Otto and W. I. Upkere, “National Security and Development in Nigeria” African Journal of Business Management, Volume 6, No. 23 (2012), p. 6765-6770. 4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13
EARLIER¶5-9
the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites (Chukwuma, 1998, 26). However, as the country evolves politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it has also been confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which have posed serious threats to its survival (Otto; Ukpere, 2012, 52). Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, would appear to have been less than optimal. Perhaps, this circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country (Wisler; Onwudiwe, 2005, 13). Yet, the environment of public policing in the country, in the last few years, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seems not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation (Alemika;Chukwuma, 2004, 14). More worrisomely is the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years, by the Federal Government, towards salvaging public policing in the country (Jemibewon, 2003, 13).At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force3. Even in spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continue to fester (Adebakin and Raimi, 2012, 8). Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management would appear to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country (see Baker, 2002; Higazi, 2008; Adamu, 2008). In contemporary Nigeria, the issue seems no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence (Kwaja, 2014, 5). Indeed, in the last few years, it is an incontrovertible fact that many state governments have not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states4. 3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. 4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. 181 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 However, in spite of their growing numbers and seeming popularity, especially since the return of democracy in 1999, issues are constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing, against the background of their penchants for wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings (see Amnesty International, 2002; HRW/ CLEEN, 2002). To this end, there have been increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. In addition, in contemporary times the country is battling its worst level of insecurity since the civil war, which ended in 1970. It is against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Nigeria’s policing environment since the return of democracy in 1999. What have been their roles in post-authoritarian Nigeria? In discharging these roles, have they really constituted themselves as security threats to the country fledgling democracy? Specifically, this article engages these questions within the framework of the objective of the study.
LATER¶10-14
4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13 5E. Alemika, and I. C. Chukwuma, The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria. Lagos: CLEEN (2004), p. 14. 6D. M. Jemibowon, The Nigeria Police in Transition: Issues, Problems and Prospect(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003), p. 13. 7For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre,Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152.
EARLIER¶7-11
3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. 4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. 181 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 However, in spite of their growing numbers and seeming popularity, especially since the return of democracy in 1999, issues are constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing, against the background of their penchants for wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings (see Amnesty International, 2002; HRW/ CLEEN, 2002). To this end, there have been increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. In addition, in contemporary times the country is battling its worst level of insecurity since the civil war, which ended in 1970. It is against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Nigeria’s policing environment since the return of democracy in 1999. What have been their roles in post-authoritarian Nigeria? In discharging these roles, have they really constituted themselves as security threats to the country fledgling democracy? Specifically, this article engages these questions within the framework of the objective of the study. In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study’s purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country’s security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions. Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing,
LATER¶10-14
4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13 5E. Alemika, and I. C. Chukwuma, The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria. Lagos: CLEEN (2004), p. 14. 6D. M. Jemibowon, The Nigeria Police in Transition: Issues, Problems and Prospect(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003), p. 13. 7For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre,Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152.
EARLIER¶0-2
179 Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 VIGILANTE GROUPS AND POLICING IN A DEMOCRATIZING NIGERIA: NAVIGATING THE CONTEXT AND ISSUES Adeniyi S. Basiru1 Olusesan A. Osunkoya2 Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. But, with the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had for centuries served the people, were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony (Ahire, 1991, 18). With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had for centuries been part of people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing rendering subsidiary roles. For decades, this was the arrangement for policing the vast Nigerian territory. Although, there were documented cases of police re-organizations, by the colonial authorities, in Lagos, in 1930 and 1954 (Akuul, 2011, 18), these, however, neither reversed the western-dominated order of policing nor re-organized the indigenous informal models of policing. Put differently, the indigenous police institutions, in differently parts of the country, continued to play subsidiary roles in public order management. Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement rather than being transformed to reflect
LATER¶10-14
4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13 5E. Alemika, and I. C. Chukwuma, The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria. Lagos: CLEEN (2004), p. 14. 6D. M. Jemibowon, The Nigeria Police in Transition: Issues, Problems and Prospect(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003), p. 13. 7For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre,Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152.
EARLIER¶2-6
For decades, this was the arrangement for policing the vast Nigerian territory. Although, there were documented cases of police re-organizations, by the colonial authorities, in Lagos, in 1930 and 1954 (Akuul, 2011, 18), these, however, neither reversed the western-dominated order of policing nor re-organized the indigenous informal models of policing. Put differently, the indigenous police institutions, in differently parts of the country, continued to play subsidiary roles in public order management. Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement rather than being transformed to reflect 1 Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria. E-mail: asbash72@ yahoo.com 2 Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijagun, Nigeria. E-mail: osunkoyaoa@tasued.edu.ng 180 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites (Chukwuma, 1998, 26). However, as the country evolves politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it has also been confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which have posed serious threats to its survival (Otto; Ukpere, 2012, 52). Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, would appear to have been less than optimal. Perhaps, this circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country (Wisler; Onwudiwe, 2005, 13). Yet, the environment of public policing in the country, in the last few years, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seems not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation (Alemika;Chukwuma, 2004, 14). More worrisomely is the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years, by the Federal Government, towards salvaging public policing in the country (Jemibewon, 2003, 13).At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force3. Even in spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continue to fester (Adebakin and Raimi, 2012, 8). Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management would appear to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country (see Baker, 2002; Higazi, 2008; Adamu, 2008). In contemporary Nigeria, the issue seems no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence (Kwaja, 2014, 5). Indeed, in the last few years, it is an incontrovertible fact that many state governments have not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states4.
LATER¶10-14
4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13 5E. Alemika, and I. C. Chukwuma, The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria. Lagos: CLEEN (2004), p. 14. 6D. M. Jemibowon, The Nigeria Police in Transition: Issues, Problems and Prospect(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003), p. 13. 7For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre,Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152.
EARLIER¶10-14
In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study’s purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country’s security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions. Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing, 182 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 here defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed, is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes. However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which has now acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by specialized body of men established by law (Loader, 2000, 325). In the words of Alemika and Chuckuma (2004, 2), ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police’. In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, edited by Catherine Soanes (2001, 692), police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order. In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chuckuma (2002, 3) sees police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order. The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the Customs and Immigration.
LATER¶10-14
4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13 5E. Alemika, and I. C. Chukwuma, The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria. Lagos: CLEEN (2004), p. 14. 6D. M. Jemibowon, The Nigeria Police in Transition: Issues, Problems and Prospect(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003), p. 13. 7For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre,Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152.
EARLIER¶18-22
care must be taken not to generalize on the subject of vigilante groups. Some seek to provide due process for arrested criminals in the absence of any viable state institutions in many areas. Some of the groups that have been labeled as vigilante groups range from neighborhood watches, communal guards, age grades, masquerade cults to hunters’ guilds. In the context of the foregoing and for the purpose of this article, therefore, vigilante groups are conceptualized loosely, following Alemika and Chukwuma (2004, 14), as a generic term in describing the different types of sub-state policing system of a country. In the Nigeria’s informal policing system, Chukwuma (2002, 11,12), identifies four typologies of vigilantism and vigilante groups, vis: religious, ethnic, state-sponsored and neighborhood/ community. 184 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 Vigilante Groups and Vigilantism in Nigeria: Origin and Evolution It has to be stressed that the idea of vigilantism and by extension, existence of vigilante groups, predated the Nigerian state (Pratten, 2008, 1). Indeed, the conclusion in most studies on the evolution of policing in Nigeria is that vigilantes of all shades, performing a myriad of policing functions in their communities, preceded the establishment of the colonial police (see Tamuno, 1970; Tamuno et al., 1993; Nwanze, 1999; Rotimi, 2001). For instance, in the eastern part of the country, before the advent of modern police establishment, there existed groups known as ‘Ndinche’ (community guards). They were put in place by villagers to arrest and bring suspected criminals before the ‘Amala’ (village council) for trials. As a matter of fact, Ndinche like the ‘Olodes’ (Hunter Guild) and the ‘Yan Banga’ in the western and northern parts respectively, for centuries, superintended public order management in the various jurisdictions (Ogbozor, 2016, 3). However, it has pointed out that irrespective of the modus operandi of these indigenous pre-colonial vigilantes, they were structured within each community’s existing political structures and values. Fourchard (2011), in an insightful study of vigilante structure in pre-colonial Yorubaland, with reference to Ibadan, recounts an interview with a respondent thus:
LATER¶10-14
4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13 5E. Alemika, and I. C. Chukwuma, The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria. Lagos: CLEEN (2004), p. 14. 6D. M. Jemibowon, The Nigeria Police in Transition: Issues, Problems and Prospect(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003), p. 13. 7For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre,Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152.
EARLIER¶28-32
• That a roster of Night Guards is kept. • That a head hunter is appointed whose duties are to supervise the arrangements made and be responsible to the local Baale (Chief) for the conduct of the guards. • That each hunter guard is clearly informed that firearms must only be used in self-defense. • If a hunter guard catches a thief or suspect, he should take him to the nearest Police station at once and hand him over to the police. • That no form of uniform is used by hunter. Instructively, this was the model of vigilantism in most communities before the country’s independence in 1960. Put differently, vigilante groups like the Night Guard system in the Oyo Province, mentioned above, while being allowed to operate because of the limited coverage of the colonial policing apparatus, were strictly under the supervision of the colonial authorities. However, with the attainment of independence in 1960, the character of vigilante groups changed from those established to promote community interests to those that now served the interests of the dominant party in the three regions of the country. For example, in the Western Region, the night 7 Till date, this is the title of the paramount ruler of the Ijebu Kingdom. 186 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 guards and other informal policing groups, especially in Ibadan, the seat of the regional government, became instruments of political intimidation and harassment of perceived political opponents by the Akintola-led government, until the fall of the Republic on January 15th, 1966 (Rotimi, 2001, 140; Fourchard, 2011, 17). Indeed, for the complementary roles that these vigilante groups played, especially in the Western Region, in instigating the collapse of the first republic, the new military regime, upon assuming power, did not only suppress the politicized vigilante groups but also guillotined their authority to vigilantism. Although, in the 1970s, due to the oil boom which led to rising incidence of armed robbery and other allied crimes, there were increasing proliferation of neighbourhood watches and guard companies, the dispositions of the military regimes that superintended the country during the period, towards vigilante groups appeared not have changed. But, by mid the 1980s, the volte face attitude of the military juntas towards vigilantes and other informal policing groups in the country changed. On why this changed attitude should not detain us here as there are abundant of studies (see Fabiyi, 2004; Fourchard, 2011).
LATER¶10-14
4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13 5E. Alemika, and I. C. Chukwuma, The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria. Lagos: CLEEN (2004), p. 14. 6D. M. Jemibowon, The Nigeria Police in Transition: Issues, Problems and Prospect(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003), p. 13. 7For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre,Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152.
EARLIER¶37-41
With such terse remark coming from the first President of a redemocratized Nigeria, the citizens seemed to have been greeted with great hopes and expectations that an atmosphere of peace and stability, built on the foundation of democracy and good governance has come to stay in their country (Basiru, 2016, 4). Put differently, an atmosphere in which the central state and its institutions, most especially those responsible for criminal justice, are alive to their historic mandates of dealing with crimes that could jeopardize peaceful co-existence. Specifically, the Nigerian Police, in line with Section 4 of the Police Act CAP 359 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1990), were expected to be a key player in the criminal justice system. The organization is charged with the responsibilities for detecting and preventing crime in the society. However, within the shortest possible time, people’s expectations of democratic dividends in terms of improved security environment would appear to have been dashed as some of the divisive and violent tendencies that had long been suppressed by the military juntas, while they reigned, resurfaced and became the defining characteristics of the new democracy (Jemibewon, 2001, 30). Indeed, during the first decade of the country’s democratization, democracy, by some commentators, was almost assumed to be coeval with violence and insecurity. To be sure, violent crimes such as serial bombings, hostage taking, kidnapping, armed robbery, and ethno-religious violence of various genres, became regular features of the country’s security landscape (see Umede, 2011, 18). As stated earlier, the Nigerian Police Force were overwhelmed and overburdened, leading to increasing roles for vigilante 188 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 groups (Ikoh, 2013, 48). As Jones (2008, 4) notes, ‘vigilante groups in Nigeria were created in response to the security vacuum left by the impotent state and its security forces’. What is being pointed out here is that, democracy, aside offering avenues for wider citizens’ participation in public affairs, has also created opportunities, due to the declining capacities of the police to manage growing insecurity, for increasing participation of the vigilante groups in policing democracy. It has to be stressed, however, that in vigilanting democracy and the demos since the beginning of the fourth republic in Nigeria, some vigilante groups, especially, those governed by formal rules, in major cities, would appear to have performed well in the complementing the formal policing structures. On the other hand, some would seem not to have fared better in vigilanting democracy as in the cases of those with conflicting agenda (Akubor 2014). The cases of the Bakassi Boys and O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) that are presented in the proceeding paragraphs typify such vigilante group.
LATER¶10-14
4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13 5E. Alemika, and I. C. Chukwuma, The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria. Lagos: CLEEN (2004), p. 14. 6D. M. Jemibowon, The Nigeria Police in Transition: Issues, Problems and Prospect(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003), p. 13. 7For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre,Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152.
EARLIER¶45-49
Given the context through which the group emerged, the original aim was to fight armed robbery and other violent crimes but with its hijack by the Governors and other powerful individuals in the Southeast, the original goal of the outfit became diluted, resulting in its politicization (Tertsakian, 2002). At this stage, the group now christened ‘political’ Bakassi Boys became the tool in the hands of the State Governors. In Anambra State, for example, prior to the formal endorsement of the Bakassi Boys’, by the administration of Dr. Chinwoke Mbadiniju, in 2002, the vigilante sector in the state, for years, had been dominated by the Onitsha Traders Association (OTA) which was formed by traders in Onitsha, in the early 1990s. However, by the advent of democracy in Anambra State, in 1999, OTA became less popular with the people as a result of its methods and thus paving way for the emergence of the Bakassi Boys, to take the center stage. In August 2002, Governor Mbadiniju formally endorsed the group, by sending a bill to the State House of Assembly for consideration. In December the same year, the bill, having been passed by the legislature and signed by the governor, became the Anambra State Vigilante Service Law, No. 9 of year 2000 (HRW/CLEEN, 2002, 10). With the coming into force of this law, the Bakassi Boys of Anambra State, officially, became the Anambra Vigilante Service (AVS) to be maintained and supervised by the Government of Anambra State. As reported by the Amnesty International (2002, 8), ‘the Anambra State Vigilante Service is the first – and to date only – armed vigilante group officially recognized by a state government in Nigeria through a bill enacted by the State Governor’. Interestingly, similar experiments were undertaken in other Southeastern states of Abia, Imo and Ebonyi States. The only except 190 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 was Enugu state where the Governor insisted that the existing system of public policing was adequate to guarantee security (Akubor, 2014,31). It must be emphasized here that the Bakassi Boys, irrespective of the names that were called in these states, before being proscribed with other similar armed groups in different parts of the country, operated with reckless abandon, killing and maiming of people in the name of crime fighting. Perhaps, it was the totality of these inhuman activities and other malfeasance coupled with the negative press that they were giving the country in the comity of nations that the group, despite the protestations of the Southeast Governors, was proscribed by the Federal Authorities in 2001. The O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) The O’odua People’s Congress (OPC), a group dominant in the Southwestern part of Nigeria, the geographical base of the Yoruba ethnic group, was initially formed on August 24th, 1994, at Mushin, Lagos, by seven individuals, all Yoruba origin, led Dr. Fredrick Fasehun. It did not start as a vigilante group but as a self-determination-oriented group to protect and defend the interests of the Yorubas in the Nigerian project (Fasehun, 2002, 159). Specifically, it arose against the background of the injustice meted out to a prominent Yoruba son, Chief Moshood Abiola and by extension, the Yoruba race, following the annulment of the 1993 presidential election, won by Abiola, by the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. However, it must be stressed that it emerged, albeit, not to restore Abiola’s stolen mandate in pristine form, but rather, to prevent the recurrence of another June 12 th episode (Fasehun, 2002, 159, 160).
LATER¶10-14
4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13 5E. Alemika, and I. C. Chukwuma, The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria. Lagos: CLEEN (2004), p. 14. 6D. M. Jemibowon, The Nigeria Police in Transition: Issues, Problems and Prospect(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003), p. 13. 7For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre,Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152.
EARLIER¶55-59
It clear from the foregoing discussions that the activities of vigilante groups in democratizing societies could be anti-social and as such could have implications on the country’s security environment. Vigilante Groups and National (In)security in Post-Authoritarian Nigeria In the contemporary mass society, no country, due to a combination of factors, is able to fight crime effectively only through public policing without the supports of sub-state actors. But, in liberal jurisdictions, while vigilante groups often operate within the perimeter of rule of law and constitutionalism, their counterparts in illiberal democracies, as the case of the post-Authoritarian Nigeria being examined in this study will soon show, tend to operate in manner that do not only put question mark on the entire concept of vigilantism but also constitutive threats to social stability and by extension, the security of the society (see Oronsaye; Igbafe, 2012). 192 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 Although, it has to be stressed that while some vigilante groups, especially, those organized as neighborhood watches, in major cities, across the country, have to a reasonable degree, tended to mimic vigilantism in liberal jurisdictions, most vigilante groups, in Nigeria, especially those that arose in the atmosphere of what Lumumba-Kasongo (1995, 409) referred to as ‘anger’, ‘conflict’ and ‘irrationality’, in the last few years, have been antithetical to established norms of vigilantism and by implications, constitute threats to social stability. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, most vigilante groups in contemporary Nigeria hardly operate in conjunction with the police as is the situation in matured democracies. Even where the vigilante groups are mandated by law to work with the police, in dealing with suspects, most of them rather than working with the police, would still resort to self-help measures. In Anambra State, for example, the law that gave legality to the activities of the Bakassi Boys, states that the vigilante group shall augment the maintenance of security in their various community and shall in particular render all lawful help and assistance to the police in the sphere of crime prevention and detection (ANSG, 2000). These clear mandates, notwithstanding, the Bakassi Boys, before they were proscribed by the Federal Government, in practice, rarely if ever render all lawful help and assistance to the police in the state (HRW/CLEEN, 2002, 13). The same remark could be made of OPC and other vigilante groups that operate at the communal levels. In bringing crime suspects to justice, these groups created detention and torture camps that look like Kangaroo police stations, courts and prisons where suspects are arbitrarily interrogated, detained, tried, tortured and summarily executed or fined (Owumi, 2013, 79).
LATER¶10-14
4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13 5E. Alemika, and I. C. Chukwuma, The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria. Lagos: CLEEN (2004), p. 14. 6D. M. Jemibowon, The Nigeria Police in Transition: Issues, Problems and Prospect(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003), p. 13. 7For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre,Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152.
EARLIER¶62-66
The point being made is here is that the repugnant and uncivil activities of vigilante groups like the OPC attracted other groups to join the vigilante sector, with the result that vigilante violence percolated virtually everywhere. For example, in 2005, vigilante violence perpetuated by a local vigilante group in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Southwest Nigeria, against the students of the Olabisi Onabanjo University, in which many students lost their lives, led to counter-attacks from the students. Indeed, the crisis did not only lead to the closure of the university but also a dusk to dawn curfew was imposed on the whole town by the Government of Ogun State, in order to reduce further human carnage. Another worrisome aspect of the activities of vigilante groups in the last few years is their politicization by the dominant political actors, especially, during elections. For instance, the Bakassi Boys, as reported by major international human rights advocacy groups, was used by the Southeastern Governors to harass and intimidate their perceived political opponents in the run to the 2003 governorship election in the region (HRW/ CLEEN, 2002,12). Linked to the above is the increasing outsourcing of policing to some militant vigilante groups in the country by the Federal and State Governments, a development which reached its zenith under the presidency of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, when militant groups like the Niger Delta Volunteer Force and the OPC were given contracts and licenses to police the country’s strategic assets in the Niger Delta. Indeed, this state of affairs to some concerned citizens was not only seen as constituting a threat to the security of the country and the concerned communities but also seemed to have downed the morale of the officers and men of the military and paramilitary forces. The issue here is that by investing in informal groups, with little or no training in arms handlings, with the roles that ought to be performed by the military and paramilitary forces, an atmosphere of insecurity and rights violation is 194 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 created by the government. For example, in an operation carried out by OPC to flush out pipeline vandals, around Arepo area, in Ogun State, Southwest Nigeria in early 2015, aside from not achieving the intended objectives, led to loss of innocent lives and destruction of properties. Conclusions This article set out to examine the character of vigilante groups in a democratizing Nigeria against the backdrop of the contradictory views about their roles. In furtherance of this objective, it clarified key concepts relevant to the discourse, examined extant literature on vigilantism and vigilante groups in Nigeria and assesses the balance sheet of vigilante groups in a democratizing Nigeria. From these reviews and analyses, it found that the character of vigilantism and vigilante groups in Nigeria is markedly different from those in liberal jurisdictions. It also notes that unlike the practice in liberal democracies where vigilante groups, in conduct and practice, conform to principles of rule of law and constitutionalism; the opposite, going by the activities of some militant vigilantes since the return of democracy, is the case. This state of affair has impacted negatively on the country’s security environment. In the light of these, it argues and concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remain the instruments of political intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them, the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of ‘anocracy’.
LATER¶10-14
4D. Wisler and D. I. Onwudiwe, Editorial: Plural Policing in Africa, International Police Executive Symposium Working Papers Series, No 6- 10 (2005). p. 13 5E. Alemika, and I. C. Chukwuma, The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria. Lagos: CLEEN (2004), p. 14. 6D. M. Jemibowon, The Nigeria Police in Transition: Issues, Problems and Prospect(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003), p. 13. 7For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre,Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152.
EARLIER¶6-11
Yet, the environment of public policing in the country, in the last few years, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seems not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation (Alemika;Chukwuma, 2004, 14). More worrisomely is the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years, by the Federal Government, towards salvaging public policing in the country (Jemibewon, 2003, 13).At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force3. Even in spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continue to fester (Adebakin and Raimi, 2012, 8). Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management would appear to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country (see Baker, 2002; Higazi, 2008; Adamu, 2008). In contemporary Nigeria, the issue seems no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence (Kwaja, 2014, 5). Indeed, in the last few years, it is an incontrovertible fact that many state governments have not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states4. 3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. 4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. 181 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 However, in spite of their growing numbers and seeming popularity, especially since the return of democracy in 1999, issues are constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing, against the background of their penchants for wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings (see Amnesty International, 2002; HRW/ CLEEN, 2002). To this end, there have been increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. In addition, in contemporary times the country is battling its worst level of insecurity since the civil war, which ended in 1970. It is against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Nigeria’s policing environment since the return of democracy in 1999. What have been their roles in post-authoritarian Nigeria? In discharging these roles, have they really constituted themselves as security threats to the country fledgling democracy? Specifically, this article engages these questions within the framework of the objective of the study. In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study’s purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country’s security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions. Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing,
LATER¶13-17
8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152. 10C. Kwaja, Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance. Kitchener: Security Sector Reform Centre(2014), p. 5 11For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, Promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre, Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20
EARLIER¶0-2
179 Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 VIGILANTE GROUPS AND POLICING IN A DEMOCRATIZING NIGERIA: NAVIGATING THE CONTEXT AND ISSUES Adeniyi S. Basiru1 Olusesan A. Osunkoya2 Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. But, with the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had for centuries served the people, were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony (Ahire, 1991, 18). With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had for centuries been part of people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing rendering subsidiary roles. For decades, this was the arrangement for policing the vast Nigerian territory. Although, there were documented cases of police re-organizations, by the colonial authorities, in Lagos, in 1930 and 1954 (Akuul, 2011, 18), these, however, neither reversed the western-dominated order of policing nor re-organized the indigenous informal models of policing. Put differently, the indigenous police institutions, in differently parts of the country, continued to play subsidiary roles in public order management. Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement rather than being transformed to reflect
LATER¶13-17
8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152. 10C. Kwaja, Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance. Kitchener: Security Sector Reform Centre(2014), p. 5 11For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, Promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre, Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20
EARLIER¶2-6
For decades, this was the arrangement for policing the vast Nigerian territory. Although, there were documented cases of police re-organizations, by the colonial authorities, in Lagos, in 1930 and 1954 (Akuul, 2011, 18), these, however, neither reversed the western-dominated order of policing nor re-organized the indigenous informal models of policing. Put differently, the indigenous police institutions, in differently parts of the country, continued to play subsidiary roles in public order management. Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement rather than being transformed to reflect 1 Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria. E-mail: asbash72@ yahoo.com 2 Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijagun, Nigeria. E-mail: osunkoyaoa@tasued.edu.ng 180 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 the country’s new status, as a sovereign nation, was further strengthened by the post-colonial ruling elites (Chukwuma, 1998, 26). However, as the country evolves politically, socially and economically, aside being confronted with legion of socio-economic and political challenges, it has also been confronted with myriads of violent crimes some of which have posed serious threats to its survival (Otto; Ukpere, 2012, 52). Unfortunately, the responses of the Nigerian Police Force, the formal policing establishment, to these challenges, despite continuous flow of funds from the governments at the federal, state and local levels, would appear to have been less than optimal. Perhaps, this circumstance prompted the Federal Government to establish the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies to assist the Nigerian Police Force, in the process of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country (Wisler; Onwudiwe, 2005, 13). Yet, the environment of public policing in the country, in the last few years, despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government, seems not to have fared better, as incidences of crimes, including those of lethal proportions, increased at all corners of the nation (Alemika;Chukwuma, 2004, 14). More worrisomely is the seeming lethargic attitude shown over the years, by the Federal Government, towards salvaging public policing in the country (Jemibewon, 2003, 13).At a point, state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force3. Even in spite of these, crisis of public policing in the country continue to fester (Adebakin and Raimi, 2012, 8). Remarkably, the seeming ineptitude of the Federal Government to effectively deal with the crisis of public order management would appear to have compelled the citizens to resort to self-help measures and whereupon, vigilante groups of various genres, once vilified, proliferated throughout the country (see Baker, 2002; Higazi, 2008; Adamu, 2008). In contemporary Nigeria, the issue seems no longer to be whether these groups should exist or not, but what would become of security at the national level if they are put out of existence (Kwaja, 2014, 5). Indeed, in the last few years, it is an incontrovertible fact that many state governments have not legalized vigilante groups to bolster the security of lives and properties in the states4.
LATER¶13-17
8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152. 10C. Kwaja, Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance. Kitchener: Security Sector Reform Centre(2014), p. 5 11For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, Promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre, Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20
EARLIER¶10-14
In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study’s purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country’s security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions. Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing, 182 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 here defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed, is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes. However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which has now acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by specialized body of men established by law (Loader, 2000, 325). In the words of Alemika and Chuckuma (2004, 2), ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police’. In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, edited by Catherine Soanes (2001, 692), police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order. In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chuckuma (2002, 3) sees police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order. The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the Customs and Immigration.
LATER¶13-17
8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152. 10C. Kwaja, Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance. Kitchener: Security Sector Reform Centre(2014), p. 5 11For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, Promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre, Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20
EARLIER¶18-22
care must be taken not to generalize on the subject of vigilante groups. Some seek to provide due process for arrested criminals in the absence of any viable state institutions in many areas. Some of the groups that have been labeled as vigilante groups range from neighborhood watches, communal guards, age grades, masquerade cults to hunters’ guilds. In the context of the foregoing and for the purpose of this article, therefore, vigilante groups are conceptualized loosely, following Alemika and Chukwuma (2004, 14), as a generic term in describing the different types of sub-state policing system of a country. In the Nigeria’s informal policing system, Chukwuma (2002, 11,12), identifies four typologies of vigilantism and vigilante groups, vis: religious, ethnic, state-sponsored and neighborhood/ community. 184 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 Vigilante Groups and Vigilantism in Nigeria: Origin and Evolution It has to be stressed that the idea of vigilantism and by extension, existence of vigilante groups, predated the Nigerian state (Pratten, 2008, 1). Indeed, the conclusion in most studies on the evolution of policing in Nigeria is that vigilantes of all shades, performing a myriad of policing functions in their communities, preceded the establishment of the colonial police (see Tamuno, 1970; Tamuno et al., 1993; Nwanze, 1999; Rotimi, 2001). For instance, in the eastern part of the country, before the advent of modern police establishment, there existed groups known as ‘Ndinche’ (community guards). They were put in place by villagers to arrest and bring suspected criminals before the ‘Amala’ (village council) for trials. As a matter of fact, Ndinche like the ‘Olodes’ (Hunter Guild) and the ‘Yan Banga’ in the western and northern parts respectively, for centuries, superintended public order management in the various jurisdictions (Ogbozor, 2016, 3). However, it has pointed out that irrespective of the modus operandi of these indigenous pre-colonial vigilantes, they were structured within each community’s existing political structures and values. Fourchard (2011), in an insightful study of vigilante structure in pre-colonial Yorubaland, with reference to Ibadan, recounts an interview with a respondent thus:
LATER¶13-17
8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152. 10C. Kwaja, Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance. Kitchener: Security Sector Reform Centre(2014), p. 5 11For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, Promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre, Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20
EARLIER¶28-32
• That a roster of Night Guards is kept. • That a head hunter is appointed whose duties are to supervise the arrangements made and be responsible to the local Baale (Chief) for the conduct of the guards. • That each hunter guard is clearly informed that firearms must only be used in self-defense. • If a hunter guard catches a thief or suspect, he should take him to the nearest Police station at once and hand him over to the police. • That no form of uniform is used by hunter. Instructively, this was the model of vigilantism in most communities before the country’s independence in 1960. Put differently, vigilante groups like the Night Guard system in the Oyo Province, mentioned above, while being allowed to operate because of the limited coverage of the colonial policing apparatus, were strictly under the supervision of the colonial authorities. However, with the attainment of independence in 1960, the character of vigilante groups changed from those established to promote community interests to those that now served the interests of the dominant party in the three regions of the country. For example, in the Western Region, the night 7 Till date, this is the title of the paramount ruler of the Ijebu Kingdom. 186 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 guards and other informal policing groups, especially in Ibadan, the seat of the regional government, became instruments of political intimidation and harassment of perceived political opponents by the Akintola-led government, until the fall of the Republic on January 15th, 1966 (Rotimi, 2001, 140; Fourchard, 2011, 17). Indeed, for the complementary roles that these vigilante groups played, especially in the Western Region, in instigating the collapse of the first republic, the new military regime, upon assuming power, did not only suppress the politicized vigilante groups but also guillotined their authority to vigilantism. Although, in the 1970s, due to the oil boom which led to rising incidence of armed robbery and other allied crimes, there were increasing proliferation of neighbourhood watches and guard companies, the dispositions of the military regimes that superintended the country during the period, towards vigilante groups appeared not have changed. But, by mid the 1980s, the volte face attitude of the military juntas towards vigilantes and other informal policing groups in the country changed. On why this changed attitude should not detain us here as there are abundant of studies (see Fabiyi, 2004; Fourchard, 2011).
LATER¶13-17
8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152. 10C. Kwaja, Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance. Kitchener: Security Sector Reform Centre(2014), p. 5 11For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, Promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre, Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20
EARLIER¶37-41
With such terse remark coming from the first President of a redemocratized Nigeria, the citizens seemed to have been greeted with great hopes and expectations that an atmosphere of peace and stability, built on the foundation of democracy and good governance has come to stay in their country (Basiru, 2016, 4). Put differently, an atmosphere in which the central state and its institutions, most especially those responsible for criminal justice, are alive to their historic mandates of dealing with crimes that could jeopardize peaceful co-existence. Specifically, the Nigerian Police, in line with Section 4 of the Police Act CAP 359 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1990), were expected to be a key player in the criminal justice system. The organization is charged with the responsibilities for detecting and preventing crime in the society. However, within the shortest possible time, people’s expectations of democratic dividends in terms of improved security environment would appear to have been dashed as some of the divisive and violent tendencies that had long been suppressed by the military juntas, while they reigned, resurfaced and became the defining characteristics of the new democracy (Jemibewon, 2001, 30). Indeed, during the first decade of the country’s democratization, democracy, by some commentators, was almost assumed to be coeval with violence and insecurity. To be sure, violent crimes such as serial bombings, hostage taking, kidnapping, armed robbery, and ethno-religious violence of various genres, became regular features of the country’s security landscape (see Umede, 2011, 18). As stated earlier, the Nigerian Police Force were overwhelmed and overburdened, leading to increasing roles for vigilante 188 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 groups (Ikoh, 2013, 48). As Jones (2008, 4) notes, ‘vigilante groups in Nigeria were created in response to the security vacuum left by the impotent state and its security forces’. What is being pointed out here is that, democracy, aside offering avenues for wider citizens’ participation in public affairs, has also created opportunities, due to the declining capacities of the police to manage growing insecurity, for increasing participation of the vigilante groups in policing democracy. It has to be stressed, however, that in vigilanting democracy and the demos since the beginning of the fourth republic in Nigeria, some vigilante groups, especially, those governed by formal rules, in major cities, would appear to have performed well in the complementing the formal policing structures. On the other hand, some would seem not to have fared better in vigilanting democracy as in the cases of those with conflicting agenda (Akubor 2014). The cases of the Bakassi Boys and O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) that are presented in the proceeding paragraphs typify such vigilante group.
LATER¶13-17
8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152. 10C. Kwaja, Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance. Kitchener: Security Sector Reform Centre(2014), p. 5 11For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, Promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre, Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20
EARLIER¶45-49
Given the context through which the group emerged, the original aim was to fight armed robbery and other violent crimes but with its hijack by the Governors and other powerful individuals in the Southeast, the original goal of the outfit became diluted, resulting in its politicization (Tertsakian, 2002). At this stage, the group now christened ‘political’ Bakassi Boys became the tool in the hands of the State Governors. In Anambra State, for example, prior to the formal endorsement of the Bakassi Boys’, by the administration of Dr. Chinwoke Mbadiniju, in 2002, the vigilante sector in the state, for years, had been dominated by the Onitsha Traders Association (OTA) which was formed by traders in Onitsha, in the early 1990s. However, by the advent of democracy in Anambra State, in 1999, OTA became less popular with the people as a result of its methods and thus paving way for the emergence of the Bakassi Boys, to take the center stage. In August 2002, Governor Mbadiniju formally endorsed the group, by sending a bill to the State House of Assembly for consideration. In December the same year, the bill, having been passed by the legislature and signed by the governor, became the Anambra State Vigilante Service Law, No. 9 of year 2000 (HRW/CLEEN, 2002, 10). With the coming into force of this law, the Bakassi Boys of Anambra State, officially, became the Anambra Vigilante Service (AVS) to be maintained and supervised by the Government of Anambra State. As reported by the Amnesty International (2002, 8), ‘the Anambra State Vigilante Service is the first – and to date only – armed vigilante group officially recognized by a state government in Nigeria through a bill enacted by the State Governor’. Interestingly, similar experiments were undertaken in other Southeastern states of Abia, Imo and Ebonyi States. The only except 190 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 was Enugu state where the Governor insisted that the existing system of public policing was adequate to guarantee security (Akubor, 2014,31). It must be emphasized here that the Bakassi Boys, irrespective of the names that were called in these states, before being proscribed with other similar armed groups in different parts of the country, operated with reckless abandon, killing and maiming of people in the name of crime fighting. Perhaps, it was the totality of these inhuman activities and other malfeasance coupled with the negative press that they were giving the country in the comity of nations that the group, despite the protestations of the Southeast Governors, was proscribed by the Federal Authorities in 2001. The O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) The O’odua People’s Congress (OPC), a group dominant in the Southwestern part of Nigeria, the geographical base of the Yoruba ethnic group, was initially formed on August 24th, 1994, at Mushin, Lagos, by seven individuals, all Yoruba origin, led Dr. Fredrick Fasehun. It did not start as a vigilante group but as a self-determination-oriented group to protect and defend the interests of the Yorubas in the Nigerian project (Fasehun, 2002, 159). Specifically, it arose against the background of the injustice meted out to a prominent Yoruba son, Chief Moshood Abiola and by extension, the Yoruba race, following the annulment of the 1993 presidential election, won by Abiola, by the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. However, it must be stressed that it emerged, albeit, not to restore Abiola’s stolen mandate in pristine form, but rather, to prevent the recurrence of another June 12 th episode (Fasehun, 2002, 159, 160).
LATER¶13-17
8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152. 10C. Kwaja, Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance. Kitchener: Security Sector Reform Centre(2014), p. 5 11For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, Promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre, Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20
EARLIER¶55-59
It clear from the foregoing discussions that the activities of vigilante groups in democratizing societies could be anti-social and as such could have implications on the country’s security environment. Vigilante Groups and National (In)security in Post-Authoritarian Nigeria In the contemporary mass society, no country, due to a combination of factors, is able to fight crime effectively only through public policing without the supports of sub-state actors. But, in liberal jurisdictions, while vigilante groups often operate within the perimeter of rule of law and constitutionalism, their counterparts in illiberal democracies, as the case of the post-Authoritarian Nigeria being examined in this study will soon show, tend to operate in manner that do not only put question mark on the entire concept of vigilantism but also constitutive threats to social stability and by extension, the security of the society (see Oronsaye; Igbafe, 2012). 192 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 Although, it has to be stressed that while some vigilante groups, especially, those organized as neighborhood watches, in major cities, across the country, have to a reasonable degree, tended to mimic vigilantism in liberal jurisdictions, most vigilante groups, in Nigeria, especially those that arose in the atmosphere of what Lumumba-Kasongo (1995, 409) referred to as ‘anger’, ‘conflict’ and ‘irrationality’, in the last few years, have been antithetical to established norms of vigilantism and by implications, constitute threats to social stability. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, most vigilante groups in contemporary Nigeria hardly operate in conjunction with the police as is the situation in matured democracies. Even where the vigilante groups are mandated by law to work with the police, in dealing with suspects, most of them rather than working with the police, would still resort to self-help measures. In Anambra State, for example, the law that gave legality to the activities of the Bakassi Boys, states that the vigilante group shall augment the maintenance of security in their various community and shall in particular render all lawful help and assistance to the police in the sphere of crime prevention and detection (ANSG, 2000). These clear mandates, notwithstanding, the Bakassi Boys, before they were proscribed by the Federal Government, in practice, rarely if ever render all lawful help and assistance to the police in the state (HRW/CLEEN, 2002, 13). The same remark could be made of OPC and other vigilante groups that operate at the communal levels. In bringing crime suspects to justice, these groups created detention and torture camps that look like Kangaroo police stations, courts and prisons where suspects are arbitrarily interrogated, detained, tried, tortured and summarily executed or fined (Owumi, 2013, 79).
LATER¶13-17
8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152. 10C. Kwaja, Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance. Kitchener: Security Sector Reform Centre(2014), p. 5 11For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, Promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre, Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20
EARLIER¶62-66
The point being made is here is that the repugnant and uncivil activities of vigilante groups like the OPC attracted other groups to join the vigilante sector, with the result that vigilante violence percolated virtually everywhere. For example, in 2005, vigilante violence perpetuated by a local vigilante group in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Southwest Nigeria, against the students of the Olabisi Onabanjo University, in which many students lost their lives, led to counter-attacks from the students. Indeed, the crisis did not only lead to the closure of the university but also a dusk to dawn curfew was imposed on the whole town by the Government of Ogun State, in order to reduce further human carnage. Another worrisome aspect of the activities of vigilante groups in the last few years is their politicization by the dominant political actors, especially, during elections. For instance, the Bakassi Boys, as reported by major international human rights advocacy groups, was used by the Southeastern Governors to harass and intimidate their perceived political opponents in the run to the 2003 governorship election in the region (HRW/ CLEEN, 2002,12). Linked to the above is the increasing outsourcing of policing to some militant vigilante groups in the country by the Federal and State Governments, a development which reached its zenith under the presidency of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, when militant groups like the Niger Delta Volunteer Force and the OPC were given contracts and licenses to police the country’s strategic assets in the Niger Delta. Indeed, this state of affairs to some concerned citizens was not only seen as constituting a threat to the security of the country and the concerned communities but also seemed to have downed the morale of the officers and men of the military and paramilitary forces. The issue here is that by investing in informal groups, with little or no training in arms handlings, with the roles that ought to be performed by the military and paramilitary forces, an atmosphere of insecurity and rights violation is 194 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 created by the government. For example, in an operation carried out by OPC to flush out pipeline vandals, around Arepo area, in Ogun State, Southwest Nigeria in early 2015, aside from not achieving the intended objectives, led to loss of innocent lives and destruction of properties. Conclusions This article set out to examine the character of vigilante groups in a democratizing Nigeria against the backdrop of the contradictory views about their roles. In furtherance of this objective, it clarified key concepts relevant to the discourse, examined extant literature on vigilantism and vigilante groups in Nigeria and assesses the balance sheet of vigilante groups in a democratizing Nigeria. From these reviews and analyses, it found that the character of vigilantism and vigilante groups in Nigeria is markedly different from those in liberal jurisdictions. It also notes that unlike the practice in liberal democracies where vigilante groups, in conduct and practice, conform to principles of rule of law and constitutionalism; the opposite, going by the activities of some militant vigilantes since the return of democracy, is the case. This state of affair has impacted negatively on the country’s security environment. In the light of these, it argues and concludes that as long as the vigilante groups, like the formal policing establishments, remain the instruments of political intimidation of political opponents by the politicians that control them, the terrain of vigilantism would continue to be in the realm of ‘anocracy’.
LATER¶13-17
8K. Adebakin and L. Raimi, “National Security Challenges and Sus-tainable economic Development: Evidence from Nigeria,”Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, Volume 1, No. (2012), pp.1-8. 9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152. 10C. Kwaja, Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance. Kitchener: Security Sector Reform Centre(2014), p. 5 11For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, Promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre, Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20
EARLIER¶9-13
181 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 However, in spite of their growing numbers and seeming popularity, especially since the return of democracy in 1999, issues are constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing, against the background of their penchants for wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings (see Amnesty International, 2002; HRW/ CLEEN, 2002). To this end, there have been increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. In addition, in contemporary times the country is battling its worst level of insecurity since the civil war, which ended in 1970. It is against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Nigeria’s policing environment since the return of democracy in 1999. What have been their roles in post-authoritarian Nigeria? In discharging these roles, have they really constituted themselves as security threats to the country fledgling democracy? Specifically, this article engages these questions within the framework of the objective of the study. In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study’s purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country’s security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions. Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing, 182 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 here defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed, is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.
LATER¶14-18
9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152. 10C. Kwaja, Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance. Kitchener: Security Sector Reform Centre(2014), p. 5 11For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, Promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre, Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20 The point being made here is that the concept of policing differs conceptually and analytically from that of police, even though, the duos are part of the social control processes. The former broadly depicts control mechanisms deployed by societal institutions, state and non-states to regulate the conduct of individuals and groups in order to bring them in conformity with acceptable norms and values. In other words, policing does not only entail law and order maintenance through the instrumentality of the state (public policing) but also through other non-state actors. Framed in this context, therefore, the police, the institutional edifice for operationalizing public policing, is one of the several strategies deployed by modern societies to maintain law and order.21 Indeed, in this understanding, Baker and Lar, in their notions of plural policing and multi-choice policing contend that in modern societies, diverse networks of groups-commercial bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local governmental regulatory agencies, as well as the public police deliver policing services to the citizen.22 Specifically, it is in lieu of this broad conceptualization of policing that the concept of vigilantism and by extension, vigilante groups seem to derive their conceptual significance.
EARLIER¶11-17
Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing, 182 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 here defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed, is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes. However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which has now acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by specialized body of men established by law (Loader, 2000, 325). In the words of Alemika and Chuckuma (2004, 2), ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police’. In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, edited by Catherine Soanes (2001, 692), police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order. In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chuckuma (2002, 3) sees police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order. The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the Customs and Immigration. The point being made here is that the concept of policing differs conceptually and analytically from that of police, even though, the duos are part of the social control processes. The former broadly depicts control mechanisms deployed by societal institutions, state and non-states, to regulate the conduct of individuals and groups in order to bring them in conformity with acceptable norms and values. In other words, policing does not only entail law and order maintenance through the instrumentality of the state (public policing) but also through other non-state actors. Framed in this context, therefore, the police, the institutional edifice for operationalizing public policing, is one of the several strategies deployed by modern societies to maintain law and order (see Johnston 1992). Indeed, it is this wise that Baker (2008) and Lar (2015) in their notions of plural policing and multi-choice policing contend that in modern societies, diverse networks of groups-commercial bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local governmental 183 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 regulatory agencies, as well as the public police deliver policing services to the citizen. Specifically, it is in lieu of this broad conceptualization of policing that the concept of vigilantism and by extension, vigilante groups seem to derive their conceptual significance. However, it is to be stressed that the concept of vigilantism, in modern policing literature, though in the last few decades has assumed wider popularity, conjures up divergent interpretations. As Lar (2015, 54) rightly affirms, ‘there is as yet no scholarly consensus on what vigilantism is – especially as regards the nature of its relationship with the state’. But for the purpose of this article, Fourchard’s perspective is apt. In relation to policing, he opines that, vigilantism is “an organized attempt by a group of ordinary citizens to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resorting to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts’ (Fourchard, 2001, 609). Viewed this way, vigilantism would depict organized efforts on the parts of citizens (individual and corporate) towards fighting criminal activities that threaten social order at the sub-state level. Flowing from the foregoing, vigilante groups would, thus, appear to suggest a voluntary group of individuals organized, usually at the communal/provincial level, for the purpose of policing. In the context of the above, therefore, it may be posited that not all groups that parade themselves, especially in contemporary Nigeria, as vigilantes are, conceptually, so. Reinforcing this contention, Shaw (2000, 48) posits that,
LATER¶14-20
9B. Baker, “When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism,”Journal of Contemporary African Affairs,Volume 20 (2002), pp. 223 244; A. Higazi, “Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria,” Africa,Volume 1 No. 78 (2008); F. Adamu, “Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria,”Africa,Vol. 1, No. 78 (2008),pp. 136 152. 10C. Kwaja, Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance. Kitchener: Security Sector Reform Centre(2014), p. 5 11For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, Promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. In: A. S. Basiru and O. A. Osunkoya, Vigilante Groups and Policing in a Democratizing Nigeria: Navigating the Context and Issues, Brazilian Journal of African Studies, Porto Alegre, Volume. 4, No. 8 (2019), pp. 179-19 12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20 The point being made here is that the concept of policing differs conceptually and analytically from that of police, even though, the duos are part of the social control processes. The former broadly depicts control mechanisms deployed by societal institutions, state and non-states to regulate the conduct of individuals and groups in order to bring them in conformity with acceptable norms and values. In other words, policing does not only entail law and order maintenance through the instrumentality of the state (public policing) but also through other non-state actors. Framed in this context, therefore, the police, the institutional edifice for operationalizing public policing, is one of the several strategies deployed by modern societies to maintain law and order.21 Indeed, in this understanding, Baker and Lar, in their notions of plural policing and multi-choice policing contend that in modern societies, diverse networks of groups-commercial bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local governmental regulatory agencies, as well as the public police deliver policing services to the citizen.22 Specifically, it is in lieu of this broad conceptualization of policing that the concept of vigilantism and by extension, vigilante groups seem to derive their conceptual significance. 13W.B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts” In:M. Black, (ed), The Importance of Language(New Jersey: Prentice Hall Press, 1962) 14ibid. 15Based on the theory of modern state proposed by Max Weber who was a German economist, philosopher and one of the founders of sociology. Max Weber’s theory provides insight into how a state should be organized in order to serve its people. Coming from this theory, bureaucracy is a structure that believed to be an important aspect for a modern state to be successful. This bureaucracy includes trained persons that are solely in charge of maintaining and managing the state structure. Available at: https://study.com/lesson/theoory-of-the-modern-statesummary-origin-a- 16I. Loader, “Plural Policing and Democratic Governance,” Social and Legal Studies, Volume 9, No. 3 (2000), p. 325. 17E. Alemika and I. C. Chukwuma, Analysis of Police and Policing in Nigeria: A desk Study on the Role of Police as a Barrier to Change or Driver of Change in Nigeria(Lagos: CLEEN,2004), p. 2
EARLIER¶13-17
here defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed, is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes. However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which has now acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by specialized body of men established by law (Loader, 2000, 325). In the words of Alemika and Chuckuma (2004, 2), ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police’. In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, edited by Catherine Soanes (2001, 692), police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order. In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chuckuma (2002, 3) sees police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order. The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the Customs and Immigration. The point being made here is that the concept of policing differs conceptually and analytically from that of police, even though, the duos are part of the social control processes. The former broadly depicts control mechanisms deployed by societal institutions, state and non-states, to regulate the conduct of individuals and groups in order to bring them in conformity with acceptable norms and values. In other words, policing does not only entail law and order maintenance through the instrumentality of the state (public policing) but also through other non-state actors. Framed in this context, therefore, the police, the institutional edifice for operationalizing public policing, is one of the several strategies deployed by modern societies to maintain law and order (see Johnston 1992). Indeed, it is this wise that Baker (2008) and Lar (2015) in their notions of plural policing and multi-choice policing contend that in modern societies, diverse networks of groups-commercial bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local governmental 183 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 regulatory agencies, as well as the public police deliver policing services to the citizen. Specifically, it is in lieu of this broad conceptualization of policing that the concept of vigilantism and by extension, vigilante groups seem to derive their conceptual significance. However, it is to be stressed that the concept of vigilantism, in modern policing literature, though in the last few decades has assumed wider popularity, conjures up divergent interpretations. As Lar (2015, 54) rightly affirms, ‘there is as yet no scholarly consensus on what vigilantism is – especially as regards the nature of its relationship with the state’. But for the purpose of this article, Fourchard’s perspective is apt. In relation to policing, he opines that, vigilantism is “an organized attempt by a group of ordinary citizens to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resorting to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts’ (Fourchard, 2001, 609). Viewed this way, vigilantism would depict organized efforts on the parts of citizens (individual and corporate) towards fighting criminal activities that threaten social order at the sub-state level. Flowing from the foregoing, vigilante groups would, thus, appear to suggest a voluntary group of individuals organized, usually at the communal/provincial level, for the purpose of policing. In the context of the above, therefore, it may be posited that not all groups that parade themselves, especially in contemporary Nigeria, as vigilantes are, conceptually, so. Reinforcing this contention, Shaw (2000, 48) posits that,
LATER¶16-20
12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20 The point being made here is that the concept of policing differs conceptually and analytically from that of police, even though, the duos are part of the social control processes. The former broadly depicts control mechanisms deployed by societal institutions, state and non-states to regulate the conduct of individuals and groups in order to bring them in conformity with acceptable norms and values. In other words, policing does not only entail law and order maintenance through the instrumentality of the state (public policing) but also through other non-state actors. Framed in this context, therefore, the police, the institutional edifice for operationalizing public policing, is one of the several strategies deployed by modern societies to maintain law and order.21 Indeed, in this understanding, Baker and Lar, in their notions of plural policing and multi-choice policing contend that in modern societies, diverse networks of groups-commercial bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local governmental regulatory agencies, as well as the public police deliver policing services to the citizen.22 Specifically, it is in lieu of this broad conceptualization of policing that the concept of vigilantism and by extension, vigilante groups seem to derive their conceptual significance. 13W.B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts” In:M. Black, (ed), The Importance of Language(New Jersey: Prentice Hall Press, 1962) 14ibid. 15Based on the theory of modern state proposed by Max Weber who was a German economist, philosopher and one of the founders of sociology. Max Weber’s theory provides insight into how a state should be organized in order to serve its people. Coming from this theory, bureaucracy is a structure that believed to be an important aspect for a modern state to be successful. This bureaucracy includes trained persons that are solely in charge of maintaining and managing the state structure. Available at: https://study.com/lesson/theoory-of-the-modern-statesummary-origin-a- 16I. Loader, “Plural Policing and Democratic Governance,” Social and Legal Studies, Volume 9, No. 3 (2000), p. 325. 17E. Alemika and I. C. Chukwuma, Analysis of Police and Policing in Nigeria: A desk Study on the Role of Police as a Barrier to Change or Driver of Change in Nigeria(Lagos: CLEEN,2004), p. 2
EARLIER¶14-18
However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which has now acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by specialized body of men established by law (Loader, 2000, 325). In the words of Alemika and Chuckuma (2004, 2), ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police’. In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, edited by Catherine Soanes (2001, 692), police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order. In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chuckuma (2002, 3) sees police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order. The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the Customs and Immigration. The point being made here is that the concept of policing differs conceptually and analytically from that of police, even though, the duos are part of the social control processes. The former broadly depicts control mechanisms deployed by societal institutions, state and non-states, to regulate the conduct of individuals and groups in order to bring them in conformity with acceptable norms and values. In other words, policing does not only entail law and order maintenance through the instrumentality of the state (public policing) but also through other non-state actors. Framed in this context, therefore, the police, the institutional edifice for operationalizing public policing, is one of the several strategies deployed by modern societies to maintain law and order (see Johnston 1992). Indeed, it is this wise that Baker (2008) and Lar (2015) in their notions of plural policing and multi-choice policing contend that in modern societies, diverse networks of groups-commercial bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local governmental 183 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 regulatory agencies, as well as the public police deliver policing services to the citizen. Specifically, it is in lieu of this broad conceptualization of policing that the concept of vigilantism and by extension, vigilante groups seem to derive their conceptual significance. However, it is to be stressed that the concept of vigilantism, in modern policing literature, though in the last few decades has assumed wider popularity, conjures up divergent interpretations. As Lar (2015, 54) rightly affirms, ‘there is as yet no scholarly consensus on what vigilantism is – especially as regards the nature of its relationship with the state’. But for the purpose of this article, Fourchard’s perspective is apt. In relation to policing, he opines that, vigilantism is “an organized attempt by a group of ordinary citizens to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resorting to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts’ (Fourchard, 2001, 609). Viewed this way, vigilantism would depict organized efforts on the parts of citizens (individual and corporate) towards fighting criminal activities that threaten social order at the sub-state level. Flowing from the foregoing, vigilante groups would, thus, appear to suggest a voluntary group of individuals organized, usually at the communal/provincial level, for the purpose of policing. In the context of the above, therefore, it may be posited that not all groups that parade themselves, especially in contemporary Nigeria, as vigilantes are, conceptually, so. Reinforcing this contention, Shaw (2000, 48) posits that, care must be taken not to generalize on the subject of vigilante groups. Some seek to provide due process for arrested criminals in the absence of any viable state institutions in many areas. Some of the groups that have been labeled as vigilante groups range from neighborhood watches, communal guards, age grades, masquerade cults to hunters’ guilds.
LATER¶16-20
12Amnesty International,“Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and southeast,” London: Amnesty International, 2002. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 23 2. Police, Policing, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse The four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s phrase, essentially contested concepts.13 To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. First, the concept of policing is defined as the process of safeguarding the individuals and groups in a community, it must be stressed; the term is old as the man itself. Indeed, even in the pre-state social formation in which life was nasty, brutish and short, as Hobbes and other the social contract philosophers theorized, policing, even though egocentric, was an integral part of the social processes.14 However, the concept assumed modern connotation, wider acceptability and popularity against the background of the monumental disorder arising from population explosion, urbanization, and industrialization brought about by modernity, which led to the advent of the Weberian15 centralized state structures. Consequently, policing, which acquired public character, did not only emerge as the key parameter for defining Weberian statehood but, most importantly, as activities undertaken by a specialized body of men established by law.16In the words of Alemika and Chukwuma, ‘the emergence of the state as an entity with claim to the monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted into the creation of specialized agencies such as the police.’17 In this wise, police is defined in relation to modern statehood. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Current English, police is defined as an official group of people employed by state to prevent and solve crime and keep public order.18 In their contribution to the meaning of police, Alemika and Chukwuma see police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution-state agencies charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order.19 The duo further adds that definition of police go beyond the constabulary sector to include other state agencies that are also involved in fighting crime and maintenance of law and order, such as the customs and immigration.20 The point being made here is that the concept of policing differs conceptually and analytically from that of police, even though, the duos are part of the social control processes. The former broadly depicts control mechanisms deployed by societal institutions, state and non-states to regulate the conduct of individuals and groups in order to bring them in conformity with acceptable norms and values. In other words, policing does not only entail law and order maintenance through the instrumentality of the state (public policing) but also through other non-state actors. Framed in this context, therefore, the police, the institutional edifice for operationalizing public policing, is one of the several strategies deployed by modern societies to maintain law and order.21 Indeed, in this understanding, Baker and Lar, in their notions of plural policing and multi-choice policing contend that in modern societies, diverse networks of groups-commercial bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local governmental regulatory agencies, as well as the public police deliver policing services to the citizen.22 Specifically, it is in lieu of this broad conceptualization of policing that the concept of vigilantism and by extension, vigilante groups seem to derive their conceptual significance. 13W.B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts” In:M. Black, (ed), The Importance of Language(New Jersey: Prentice Hall Press, 1962) 14ibid. 15Based on the theory of modern state proposed by Max Weber who was a German economist, philosopher and one of the founders of sociology. Max Weber’s theory provides insight into how a state should be organized in order to serve its people. Coming from this theory, bureaucracy is a structure that believed to be an important aspect for a modern state to be successful. This bureaucracy includes trained persons that are solely in charge of maintaining and managing the state structure. Available at: https://study.com/lesson/theoory-of-the-modern-statesummary-origin-a- 16I. Loader, “Plural Policing and Democratic Governance,” Social and Legal Studies, Volume 9, No. 3 (2000), p. 325. 17E. Alemika and I. C. Chukwuma, Analysis of Police and Policing in Nigeria: A desk Study on the Role of Police as a Barrier to Change or Driver of Change in Nigeria(Lagos: CLEEN,2004), p. 2
EARLIER¶15-21
The point being made here is that the concept of policing differs conceptually and analytically from that of police, even though, the duos are part of the social control processes. The former broadly depicts control mechanisms deployed by societal institutions, state and non-states, to regulate the conduct of individuals and groups in order to bring them in conformity with acceptable norms and values. In other words, policing does not only entail law and order maintenance through the instrumentality of the state (public policing) but also through other non-state actors. Framed in this context, therefore, the police, the institutional edifice for operationalizing public policing, is one of the several strategies deployed by modern societies to maintain law and order (see Johnston 1992). Indeed, it is this wise that Baker (2008) and Lar (2015) in their notions of plural policing and multi-choice policing contend that in modern societies, diverse networks of groups-commercial bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local governmental 183 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 regulatory agencies, as well as the public police deliver policing services to the citizen. Specifically, it is in lieu of this broad conceptualization of policing that the concept of vigilantism and by extension, vigilante groups seem to derive their conceptual significance. However, it is to be stressed that the concept of vigilantism, in modern policing literature, though in the last few decades has assumed wider popularity, conjures up divergent interpretations. As Lar (2015, 54) rightly affirms, ‘there is as yet no scholarly consensus on what vigilantism is – especially as regards the nature of its relationship with the state’. But for the purpose of this article, Fourchard’s perspective is apt. In relation to policing, he opines that, vigilantism is “an organized attempt by a group of ordinary citizens to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resorting to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts’ (Fourchard, 2001, 609). Viewed this way, vigilantism would depict organized efforts on the parts of citizens (individual and corporate) towards fighting criminal activities that threaten social order at the sub-state level. Flowing from the foregoing, vigilante groups would, thus, appear to suggest a voluntary group of individuals organized, usually at the communal/provincial level, for the purpose of policing. In the context of the above, therefore, it may be posited that not all groups that parade themselves, especially in contemporary Nigeria, as vigilantes are, conceptually, so. Reinforcing this contention, Shaw (2000, 48) posits that, care must be taken not to generalize on the subject of vigilante groups. Some seek to provide due process for arrested criminals in the absence of any viable state institutions in many areas. Some of the groups that have been labeled as vigilante groups range from neighborhood watches, communal guards, age grades, masquerade cults to hunters’ guilds. In the context of the foregoing and for the purpose of this article, therefore, vigilante groups are conceptualized loosely, following Alemika and Chukwuma (2004, 14), as a generic term in describing the different types of sub-state policing system of a country. In the Nigeria’s informal policing system, Chukwuma (2002, 11,12), identifies four typologies of vigilantism and vigilante groups, vis: religious, ethnic, state-sponsored and neighborhood/ community. 184 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 Vigilante Groups and Vigilantism in Nigeria: Origin and Evolution It has to be stressed that the idea of vigilantism and by extension, existence of vigilante groups, predated the Nigerian state (Pratten, 2008, 1). Indeed, the conclusion in most studies on the evolution of policing in Nigeria is that vigilantes of all shades, performing a myriad of policing functions in their communities, preceded the establishment of the colonial police (see Tamuno, 1970; Tamuno et al., 1993; Nwanze, 1999; Rotimi, 2001). For instance, in the eastern part of the country, before the advent of modern police establishment, there existed groups known as ‘Ndinche’ (community guards). They were put in place by villagers to arrest and bring suspected criminals before the ‘Amala’ (village council) for trials. As a matter of fact, Ndinche like the ‘Olodes’ (Hunter Guild) and the ‘Yan Banga’ in the western and northern parts respectively, for centuries, superintended public order management in the various jurisdictions (Ogbozor, 2016, 3).
LATER¶21-27
18Catherine Soanes...2001, p. 692, 19E. Alemika and I. C. Chukwuma, The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria (Lagos: CLEEN,2004) p. 3 20ibid. 21L. Johnston, The Rebirth of Private Policing(New York: Routledge, 1992). 22B. Baker,Multi Choice Policing in Africa (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2008); J. T. Lar, Vigilantism, state and society: A History of Plural Policing in Plateau State, Nigeria, 1950 to the Present. Doctoral, Thesis, Bayreuth International Graduate School for African Studies (BIGSAS), University of Bayreuth, Germany 2015. Vigilantism and Policing In Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, 1987 – 1999 Page | 24 However, it is to be stressed that the concept of vigilantism, in modern policing literature, though in the last few decades has assumed wider popularity, conjures up divergent interpretations. As Lar affirms, ‘there is as yet no scholarly consensus on what vigilantism is – especially as regards the nature of its relationship with the state.’23 But for the purpose of this article, Fourchard’s perspective is apt. In relation to policing, he opines that, vigilantism is “an organized attempt by a group of ordinary citizens to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resorting to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts.’24 Viewed this way, vigilantism would depict organized efforts on the parts of citizens (individual and corporate) towards fighting criminal activities that threaten social order at the sub-state level. Flowing from the foregoing, vigilante groups would, thus, appear to suggest a voluntary group of individuals organized, usually at the communal/provincial level, for the purpose of policing. In the context of the above, therefore, it may be posited that not all groups that parade themselves, especially in contemporary Nigeria, as vigilantes are, conceptually so. Reinforcing this contention, Shaw posits that: Care must be taken not to generalize on the subject of vigilante groups. Some seek to provide due process for arrested criminals in the absence of any viable state institutions in many areas. Some of the groups that have been labeled as vigilante groups range from neighborhood watches, communal guards, age grades, masquerade cults to hunters’ guilds.25 In the context of the foregoing and for the purpose of this article, therefore, vigilante groups are conceptualized loosely, following Alemika and Chukwuma, as a generic term in describing the different types of sub-state policing system of a country.26 In the Nigeria’s informal policing system, Chukwuma identifies four typologies of vigilantism and vigilante groups, vis: religious, ethnic, state-sponsored and neighborhood/ community.27 3. Origin and Evolution of Vigilante Groups and Vigilantism in Nigeria It has to be stressed that the idea of vigilantism and by extension, existence of vigilante groups, predated the Nigerian state.28 Indeed, the conclusion in most studies on the evolution of policing in Nigeria is that vigilantes of all shades, performing a myriad of policing functions in their communities, preceded the establishment of the colonial police.29For instance, in the eastern part of the country, before the advent of modern police establishment, there existed groups known as ‘Ndinche’ (community guards). They were put in place by villagers to arrest and bring suspected criminals before the ‘Amala’ (village council) for trials. As a matter of fact, Ndinche like the ‘Olodes’ (Hunter Guild) and the ‘Yan Banga’ in the western and northern parts respectively, for centuries, superintended public order management in the various jurisdictions.30 However, it has been pointed out that irrespective of the modus operandi of these indigenous pre-colonial vigilantes, they were structured within each community’s existing political structures and values. Fourchard in an insightful study of vigilante structure in pre-colonial Yorubaland, with reference to Ibadan, recounts an interview with a respondent thus:
EARLIER¶19-23
In the context of the foregoing and for the purpose of this article, therefore, vigilante groups are conceptualized loosely, following Alemika and Chukwuma (2004, 14), as a generic term in describing the different types of sub-state policing system of a country. In the Nigeria’s informal policing system, Chukwuma (2002, 11,12), identifies four typologies of vigilantism and vigilante groups, vis: religious, ethnic, state-sponsored and neighborhood/ community. 184 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 Vigilante Groups and Vigilantism in Nigeria: Origin and Evolution It has to be stressed that the idea of vigilantism and by extension, existence of vigilante groups, predated the Nigerian state (Pratten, 2008, 1). Indeed, the conclusion in most studies on the evolution of policing in Nigeria is that vigilantes of all shades, performing a myriad of policing functions in their communities, preceded the establishment of the colonial police (see Tamuno, 1970; Tamuno et al., 1993; Nwanze, 1999; Rotimi, 2001). For instance, in the eastern part of the country, before the advent of modern police establishment, there existed groups known as ‘Ndinche’ (community guards). They were put in place by villagers to arrest and bring suspected criminals before the ‘Amala’ (village council) for trials. As a matter of fact, Ndinche like the ‘Olodes’ (Hunter Guild) and the ‘Yan Banga’ in the western and northern parts respectively, for centuries, superintended public order management in the various jurisdictions (Ogbozor, 2016, 3). However, it has pointed out that irrespective of the modus operandi of these indigenous pre-colonial vigilantes, they were structured within each community’s existing political structures and values. Fourchard (2011), in an insightful study of vigilante structure in pre-colonial Yorubaland, with reference to Ibadan, recounts an interview with a respondent thus: there was a chain of transmission of orders coming from the Olubadan5 and from heads of powerful lineages associated to the Olubadan (the Mogaji6) who transmitted information to heads of compound (Baale). The Mogaji were in charge of sode; they will call the head of each household, then they will tell them about the need to keep watch on the surroundings. In each household, the Baale will volunteer at least one or two people.
LATER¶24-28
Care must be taken not to generalize on the subject of vigilante groups. Some seek to provide due process for arrested criminals in the absence of any viable state institutions in many areas. Some of the groups that have been labeled as vigilante groups range from neighborhood watches, communal guards, age grades, masquerade cults to hunters’ guilds.25 In the context of the foregoing and for the purpose of this article, therefore, vigilante groups are conceptualized loosely, following Alemika and Chukwuma, as a generic term in describing the different types of sub-state policing system of a country.26 In the Nigeria’s informal policing system, Chukwuma identifies four typologies of vigilantism and vigilante groups, vis: religious, ethnic, state-sponsored and neighborhood/ community.27 3. Origin and Evolution of Vigilante Groups and Vigilantism in Nigeria It has to be stressed that the idea of vigilantism and by extension, existence of vigilante groups, predated the Nigerian state.28 Indeed, the conclusion in most studies on the evolution of policing in Nigeria is that vigilantes of all shades, performing a myriad of policing functions in their communities, preceded the establishment of the colonial police.29For instance, in the eastern part of the country, before the advent of modern police establishment, there existed groups known as ‘Ndinche’ (community guards). They were put in place by villagers to arrest and bring suspected criminals before the ‘Amala’ (village council) for trials. As a matter of fact, Ndinche like the ‘Olodes’ (Hunter Guild) and the ‘Yan Banga’ in the western and northern parts respectively, for centuries, superintended public order management in the various jurisdictions.30 However, it has been pointed out that irrespective of the modus operandi of these indigenous pre-colonial vigilantes, they were structured within each community’s existing political structures and values. Fourchard in an insightful study of vigilante structure in pre-colonial Yorubaland, with reference to Ibadan, recounts an interview with a respondent thus: 23J.T.Lar, Vigilantism, State and Society: A History of Plural Policing in Plateau State, Nigeria, 1950 to the Present. Doctoral Thesis, Bayreuth International Graduate School for African Studies (BIGSAS), University of Bayreuth Germany, 2015., p. 54.
EARLIER¶19-24
In the context of the foregoing and for the purpose of this article, therefore, vigilante groups are conceptualized loosely, following Alemika and Chukwuma (2004, 14), as a generic term in describing the different types of sub-state policing system of a country. In the Nigeria’s informal policing system, Chukwuma (2002, 11,12), identifies four typologies of vigilantism and vigilante groups, vis: religious, ethnic, state-sponsored and neighborhood/ community. 184 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 Vigilante Groups and Vigilantism in Nigeria: Origin and Evolution It has to be stressed that the idea of vigilantism and by extension, existence of vigilante groups, predated the Nigerian state (Pratten, 2008, 1). Indeed, the conclusion in most studies on the evolution of policing in Nigeria is that vigilantes of all shades, performing a myriad of policing functions in their communities, preceded the establishment of the colonial police (see Tamuno, 1970; Tamuno et al., 1993; Nwanze, 1999; Rotimi, 2001). For instance, in the eastern part of the country, before the advent of modern police establishment, there existed groups known as ‘Ndinche’ (community guards). They were put in place by villagers to arrest and bring suspected criminals before the ‘Amala’ (village council) for trials. As a matter of fact, Ndinche like the ‘Olodes’ (Hunter Guild) and the ‘Yan Banga’ in the western and northern parts respectively, for centuries, superintended public order management in the various jurisdictions (Ogbozor, 2016, 3). However, it has pointed out that irrespective of the modus operandi of these indigenous pre-colonial vigilantes, they were structured within each community’s existing political structures and values. Fourchard (2011), in an insightful study of vigilante structure in pre-colonial Yorubaland, with reference to Ibadan, recounts an interview with a respondent thus: there was a chain of transmission of orders coming from the Olubadan5 and from heads of powerful lineages associated to the Olubadan (the Mogaji6) who transmitted information to heads of compound (Baale). The Mogaji were in charge of sode; they will call the head of each household, then they will tell them about the need to keep watch on the surroundings. In each household, the Baale will volunteer at least one or two people. The point here is that the indigenous vigilante groups, before the foray of colonialism into the various communities that were later amalgamated to become Nigeria, did not operate in a vacuum but interfaced with the various communities to provide policing to their people. In other words, they functioned as self-help entities at the peripheral level of the communities (towns/kingdoms), assisting ‘stately’ institutions in discharging policing duties. For example, in pre-colonial Hausa Emirate state system, the vigilantes at the local level complemented the Dogaris-palace police-in maintaining law
LATER¶24-29
Care must be taken not to generalize on the subject of vigilante groups. Some seek to provide due process for arrested criminals in the absence of any viable state institutions in many areas. Some of the groups that have been labeled as vigilante groups range from neighborhood watches, communal guards, age grades, masquerade cults to hunters’ guilds.25 In the context of the foregoing and for the purpose of this article, therefore, vigilante groups are conceptualized loosely, following Alemika and Chukwuma, as a generic term in describing the different types of sub-state policing system of a country.26 In the Nigeria’s informal policing system, Chukwuma identifies four typologies of vigilantism and vigilante groups, vis: religious, ethnic, state-sponsored and neighborhood/ community.27 3. Origin and Evolution of Vigilante Groups and Vigilantism in Nigeria It has to be stressed that the idea of vigilantism and by extension, existence of vigilante groups, predated the Nigerian state.28 Indeed, the conclusion in most studies on the evolution of policing in Nigeria is that vigilantes of all shades, performing a myriad of policing functions in their communities, preceded the establishment of the colonial police.29For instance, in the eastern part of the country, before the advent of modern police establishment, there existed groups known as ‘Ndinche’ (community guards). They were put in place by villagers to arrest and bring suspected criminals before the ‘Amala’ (village council) for trials. As a matter of fact, Ndinche like the ‘Olodes’ (Hunter Guild) and the ‘Yan Banga’ in the western and northern parts respectively, for centuries, superintended public order management in the various jurisdictions.30 However, it has been pointed out that irrespective of the modus operandi of these indigenous pre-colonial vigilantes, they were structured within each community’s existing political structures and values. Fourchard in an insightful study of vigilante structure in pre-colonial Yorubaland, with reference to Ibadan, recounts an interview with a respondent thus: 23J.T.Lar, Vigilantism, State and Society: A History of Plural Policing in Plateau State, Nigeria, 1950 to the Present. Doctoral Thesis, Bayreuth International Graduate School for African Studies (BIGSAS), University of Bayreuth Germany, 2015., p. 54. 24L. Fourchard, “The Politics of Mobilization for Security in South African Townships,” African AffairsVolume 110, No. 441 (2011) p. 609 25M. Shaw, Crime and Policing in Transitions: Comparative Perspectives (Johannesburg: Princeville, 2000) p. 48.
EARLIER¶21-26
Vigilante Groups and Vigilantism in Nigeria: Origin and Evolution It has to be stressed that the idea of vigilantism and by extension, existence of vigilante groups, predated the Nigerian state (Pratten, 2008, 1). Indeed, the conclusion in most studies on the evolution of policing in Nigeria is that vigilantes of all shades, performing a myriad of policing functions in their communities, preceded the establishment of the colonial police (see Tamuno, 1970; Tamuno et al., 1993; Nwanze, 1999; Rotimi, 2001). For instance, in the eastern part of the country, before the advent of modern police establishment, there existed groups known as ‘Ndinche’ (community guards). They were put in place by villagers to arrest and bring suspected criminals before the ‘Amala’ (village council) for trials. As a matter of fact, Ndinche like the ‘Olodes’ (Hunter Guild) and the ‘Yan Banga’ in the western and northern parts respectively, for centuries, superintended public order management in the various jurisdictions (Ogbozor, 2016, 3). However, it has pointed out that irrespective of the modus operandi of these indigenous pre-colonial vigilantes, they were structured within each community’s existing political structures and values. Fourchard (2011), in an insightful study of vigilante structure in pre-colonial Yorubaland, with reference to Ibadan, recounts an interview with a respondent thus: there was a chain of transmission of orders coming from the Olubadan5 and from heads of powerful lineages associated to the Olubadan (the Mogaji6) who transmitted information to heads of compound (Baale). The Mogaji were in charge of sode; they will call the head of each household, then they will tell them about the need to keep watch on the surroundings. In each household, the Baale will volunteer at least one or two people. The point here is that the indigenous vigilante groups, before the foray of colonialism into the various communities that were later amalgamated to become Nigeria, did not operate in a vacuum but interfaced with the various communities to provide policing to their people. In other words, they functioned as self-help entities at the peripheral level of the communities (towns/kingdoms), assisting ‘stately’ institutions in discharging policing duties. For example, in pre-colonial Hausa Emirate state system, the vigilantes at the local level complemented the Dogaris-palace police-in maintaining law 5 Olubadan refers to the title of the paramount head of Ibadan. 6 Mogaji is the head of an extended family comprising many households in Ibadan. 185 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 and order within the Emirate. Similar patterns operated among the Ijebus, a Yoruba sub-ethnic group, in which the various vigilantes complemented the Odis-palace police in policing the centre and the peripheries of the Ijebu state system under the Awujale7. It is worthy to note that this dual system of policing involving the vigilantes and the Kings’ police was, however transformed by colonial rule, which added another framework of policing leading to a tripartite system involving the vigilantes, the palace police and the colonial police.
LATER¶32-37
29T. Tamuno, The Police in Modem Nigeria 1861-1965(Ibadan: University Press Ibadan, 1970); T. Tamuno, et al.Policing Nigeria, Past, Present and Future (Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited, 1993); S. Nwanze, In: T. Timothy, Thy Hands oh God: The Man, the Cop, the Preachet (Lagos: Nio Publishers, 1999); K. Rotimi, The Police in a Federal State: The Nigerian experience(Ibadan: College Press, 2001). 30E. Ogbozor, Understanding the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2016), p. 3. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 25 heads of compound (Baale). The Mogaji were in charge of sode; they will call the head of each household, then they will tell them about the need to keep watch on the surroundings. In each household, the Baale will volunteer at least one or two people.31 The point here is that the indigenous vigilante groups, before the foray of colonialism into the various communities that were later amalgamated to become Nigeria, did not operate in a vacuum but interfaced with the various communities to provide policing to their people. In other words, they functioned as self-help entities at the peripheral level of the communities (towns/kingdoms), assisting ‘stately’ institutions in discharging policing duties. For example, in pre-colonial Hausa Emirate state system, the vigilantes at the local level complemented the Dogarispalace police-in maintaining law and order within the Emirate. Similar patterns operated among the Ijebu, a Yoruba sub-ethnic group, in which the various vigilantes complemented the Odis-palace police in policing the centre and the peripheries of the Ijebu state system under the Awujale.32 It is worthy to note that this dual system of policing involving the vigilantes and the Kings’ police was, however, transformed by colonial rule, which added another framework of policing, leading to a tripartite system involving the vigilantes, the palace police and the colonial police.33 It must be stressed, however, that in spite of their relegation to the background in the colonial tripartite policing architecture, vigilante groups continued to attract the patronages of the people in various communities, as a result of growing crime rates brought about by rapid urbanization.34 For example, in Ibadan and other Yoruba communities, in the second half of the 20th century, the night guard system (vigilantes), that had been suppressed, for decades, by colonial officials for being ‘dangerous’, was re-invigorated, under strict supervision. Fourchard adumbrates the five guidelines that a Colonial Resident in 1948, in Oyo, gave for the operation of the night guards within his domain as follow: (i). that a roster of Night Guards is kept; (ii). that a head hunter is appointed whose duties are to supervise the arrangements made and be responsible to the local Baale (Chief) for the conduct of the guards; (iii). that each hunter guard is clearly informed that firearms must only be used in self-defense; (iv). If a hunter guard catches a thief or suspect, he should take him to the nearest police station at once and hand him over to the police; (v). that no form of uniform is used by hunter.35 Instructively, this was the model of vigilantism in most communities before the country’s independence in 1960. Put differently, vigilante groups like the Night Guard system in the Oyo Province, mentioned above, while being allowed to operate because of the limited coverage of the colonial policing apparatus, were strictly under the supervision of the colonial authorities. However, with the attainment of independence in 1960, the character of vigilante groups changed from those established to promote community interests to those that now served the interests of the dominant party in the three regions of the country. For example, in the Western Region, the night guards and other informal policing groups, especially in Ibadan, the seat of the regional government, became instruments of political intimidation and harassment of perceived political opponents by the Akintola-led government, until the fall of the Republic on January 15th, 1966.36
EARLIER¶24-31
The point here is that the indigenous vigilante groups, before the foray of colonialism into the various communities that were later amalgamated to become Nigeria, did not operate in a vacuum but interfaced with the various communities to provide policing to their people. In other words, they functioned as self-help entities at the peripheral level of the communities (towns/kingdoms), assisting ‘stately’ institutions in discharging policing duties. For example, in pre-colonial Hausa Emirate state system, the vigilantes at the local level complemented the Dogaris-palace police-in maintaining law 5 Olubadan refers to the title of the paramount head of Ibadan. 6 Mogaji is the head of an extended family comprising many households in Ibadan. 185 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 and order within the Emirate. Similar patterns operated among the Ijebus, a Yoruba sub-ethnic group, in which the various vigilantes complemented the Odis-palace police in policing the centre and the peripheries of the Ijebu state system under the Awujale7. It is worthy to note that this dual system of policing involving the vigilantes and the Kings’ police was, however transformed by colonial rule, which added another framework of policing leading to a tripartite system involving the vigilantes, the palace police and the colonial police. It must be stressed, however, that in spite of their relegation to the background in the colonial tripartite policing architecture, vigilante groups continued to attract the patronages of the people in various communities, as a result of growing crime rates brought about by rapid urbanization (Watson, 2003, 76). For example, in Ibadan and other Yoruba communities, in the second half of the 20th century, the night guard system (vigilantes), that had been suppressed, for decades, by colonial officials for being ‘dangerous’, was re-invigorated, under strict supervision. Fourchard (2011, 11) adumbrates the five guidelines that a Colonial Resident in 1948, in Oyo, gave for the operation of the night guards within his domain as follow: • That a roster of Night Guards is kept. • That a head hunter is appointed whose duties are to supervise the arrangements made and be responsible to the local Baale (Chief) for the conduct of the guards. • That each hunter guard is clearly informed that firearms must only be used in self-defense. • If a hunter guard catches a thief or suspect, he should take him to the nearest Police station at once and hand him over to the police. • That no form of uniform is used by hunter. Instructively, this was the model of vigilantism in most communities before the country’s independence in 1960. Put differently, vigilante groups like the Night Guard system in the Oyo Province, mentioned above, while being allowed to operate because of the limited coverage of the colonial policing apparatus, were strictly under the supervision of the colonial authorities. However, with the attainment of independence in 1960, the character of vigilante groups changed from those established to promote community interests to those that now served the interests of the dominant party in the three regions of the country. For example, in the Western Region, the night 7 Till date, this is the title of the paramount ruler of the Ijebu Kingdom. 186 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 guards and other informal policing groups, especially in Ibadan, the seat of the regional government, became instruments of political intimidation and harassment of perceived political opponents by the Akintola-led government, until the fall of the Republic on January 15th, 1966 (Rotimi, 2001, 140; Fourchard, 2011, 17).
LATER¶33-39
30E. Ogbozor, Understanding the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2016), p. 3. IJLSS 2(1): 21-32 Page | 25 heads of compound (Baale). The Mogaji were in charge of sode; they will call the head of each household, then they will tell them about the need to keep watch on the surroundings. In each household, the Baale will volunteer at least one or two people.31 The point here is that the indigenous vigilante groups, before the foray of colonialism into the various communities that were later amalgamated to become Nigeria, did not operate in a vacuum but interfaced with the various communities to provide policing to their people. In other words, they functioned as self-help entities at the peripheral level of the communities (towns/kingdoms), assisting ‘stately’ institutions in discharging policing duties. For example, in pre-colonial Hausa Emirate state system, the vigilantes at the local level complemented the Dogarispalace police-in maintaining law and order within the Emirate. Similar patterns operated among the Ijebu, a Yoruba sub-ethnic group, in which the various vigilantes complemented the Odis-palace police in policing the centre and the peripheries of the Ijebu state system under the Awujale.32 It is worthy to note that this dual system of policing involving the vigilantes and the Kings’ police was, however, transformed by colonial rule, which added another framework of policing, leading to a tripartite system involving the vigilantes, the palace police and the colonial police.33 It must be stressed, however, that in spite of their relegation to the background in the colonial tripartite policing architecture, vigilante groups continued to attract the patronages of the people in various communities, as a result of growing crime rates brought about by rapid urbanization.34 For example, in Ibadan and other Yoruba communities, in the second half of the 20th century, the night guard system (vigilantes), that had been suppressed, for decades, by colonial officials for being ‘dangerous’, was re-invigorated, under strict supervision. Fourchard adumbrates the five guidelines that a Colonial Resident in 1948, in Oyo, gave for the operation of the night guards within his domain as follow: (i). that a roster of Night Guards is kept; (ii). that a head hunter is appointed whose duties are to supervise the arrangements made and be responsible to the local Baale (Chief) for the conduct of the guards; (iii). that each hunter guard is clearly informed that firearms must only be used in self-defense; (iv). If a hunter guard catches a thief or suspect, he should take him to the nearest police station at once and hand him over to the police; (v). that no form of uniform is used by hunter.35 Instructively, this was the model of vigilantism in most communities before the country’s independence in 1960. Put differently, vigilante groups like the Night Guard system in the Oyo Province, mentioned above, while being allowed to operate because of the limited coverage of the colonial policing apparatus, were strictly under the supervision of the colonial authorities. However, with the attainment of independence in 1960, the character of vigilante groups changed from those established to promote community interests to those that now served the interests of the dominant party in the three regions of the country. For example, in the Western Region, the night guards and other informal policing groups, especially in Ibadan, the seat of the regional government, became instruments of political intimidation and harassment of perceived political opponents by the Akintola-led government, until the fall of the Republic on January 15th, 1966.36 Indeed, for the complementary roles that these vigilante groups played, especially in the Western Region, in instigating the collapse of the first republic, the new military regime, upon assuming power, did not only suppress the politicized vigilante groups but also guillotined their authority to vigilantism. Although, in the 1970s, due to the oil boom which led to rising incidence of armed robbery and other allied crimes, there were increasing proliferation of neighbourhood watches and guard companies, the dispositions of the military regimes that superintended the country during the period, towards vigilante groups appeared not have changed. But, by the mid 1980s, the volte 31L. Fourchard, “The Politics of Mobilization for Security in South African Townships,” African AffairsVolume 110, No. 441 (2011) 32ibid. 33ibid. 34R. Watson,Civil Disorder is the Disease of Ibadan, Chieftaincy and Civic Culture in a Yoruba City(Oxford: James Currey, 2003), p.76.
EARLIER¶29-34
Instructively, this was the model of vigilantism in most communities before the country’s independence in 1960. Put differently, vigilante groups like the Night Guard system in the Oyo Province, mentioned above, while being allowed to operate because of the limited coverage of the colonial policing apparatus, were strictly under the supervision of the colonial authorities. However, with the attainment of independence in 1960, the character of vigilante groups changed from those established to promote community interests to those that now served the interests of the dominant party in the three regions of the country. For example, in the Western Region, the night 7 Till date, this is the title of the paramount ruler of the Ijebu Kingdom. 186 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 guards and other informal policing groups, especially in Ibadan, the seat of the regional government, became instruments of political intimidation and harassment of perceived political opponents by the Akintola-led government, until the fall of the Republic on January 15th, 1966 (Rotimi, 2001, 140; Fourchard, 2011, 17). Indeed, for the complementary roles that these vigilante groups played, especially in the Western Region, in instigating the collapse of the first republic, the new military regime, upon assuming power, did not only suppress the politicized vigilante groups but also guillotined their authority to vigilantism. Although, in the 1970s, due to the oil boom which led to rising incidence of armed robbery and other allied crimes, there were increasing proliferation of neighbourhood watches and guard companies, the dispositions of the military regimes that superintended the country during the period, towards vigilante groups appeared not have changed. But, by mid the 1980s, the volte face attitude of the military juntas towards vigilantes and other informal policing groups in the country changed. On why this changed attitude should not detain us here as there are abundant of studies (see Fabiyi, 2004; Fourchard, 2011). Specifically, in 1986, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, through its representatives at the state levels, in order to improve the battered image of the Nigerian Police Force, formally embraced vigilante groups as part of the country’s policing structure. In April 1987, in Oyo State, the Military Governor, Col. Adetunji Olurin, by virtue of the Mobilization Community Development Committee Edict (1987), gave legal backing to vigilantism in the state when he officially launched vigilante groups (OYSG, 1987). Legitimizing vigilantism, the Governor had said, ‘unlike the previous vigilante groups, the activities of the groups being inaugurated were protected by the law’ (see Tribune, 07/04/87). With such terse statement coming from a key member of a military junta, the environment of vigilantism in the country would appear to have changed, whereupon, the number of groups engaged in vigilantism, across the country increased. Interestingly, it was, perhaps, this legacy of government’s tacit support for vigilante groups that snowballed into the fourth republic that commenced on May 29th, 1999. 187 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 Vigilante Groups and Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Nigeria
LATER¶35-40
The point here is that the indigenous vigilante groups, before the foray of colonialism into the various communities that were later amalgamated to become Nigeria, did not operate in a vacuum but interfaced with the various communities to provide policing to their people. In other words, they functioned as self-help entities at the peripheral level of the communities (towns/kingdoms), assisting ‘stately’ institutions in discharging policing duties. For example, in pre-colonial Hausa Emirate state system, the vigilantes at the local level complemented the Dogarispalace police-in maintaining law and order within the Emirate. Similar patterns operated among the Ijebu, a Yoruba sub-ethnic group, in which the various vigilantes complemented the Odis-palace police in policing the centre and the peripheries of the Ijebu state system under the Awujale.32 It is worthy to note that this dual system of policing involving the vigilantes and the Kings’ police was, however, transformed by colonial rule, which added another framework of policing, leading to a tripartite system involving the vigilantes, the palace police and the colonial police.33 It must be stressed, however, that in spite of their relegation to the background in the colonial tripartite policing architecture, vigilante groups continued to attract the patronages of the people in various communities, as a result of growing crime rates brought about by rapid urbanization.34 For example, in Ibadan and other Yoruba communities, in the second half of the 20th century, the night guard system (vigilantes), that had been suppressed, for decades, by colonial officials for being ‘dangerous’, was re-invigorated, under strict supervision. Fourchard adumbrates the five guidelines that a Colonial Resident in 1948, in Oyo, gave for the operation of the night guards within his domain as follow: (i). that a roster of Night Guards is kept; (ii). that a head hunter is appointed whose duties are to supervise the arrangements made and be responsible to the local Baale (Chief) for the conduct of the guards; (iii). that each hunter guard is clearly informed that firearms must only be used in self-defense; (iv). If a hunter guard catches a thief or suspect, he should take him to the nearest police station at once and hand him over to the police; (v). that no form of uniform is used by hunter.35 Instructively, this was the model of vigilantism in most communities before the country’s independence in 1960. Put differently, vigilante groups like the Night Guard system in the Oyo Province, mentioned above, while being allowed to operate because of the limited coverage of the colonial policing apparatus, were strictly under the supervision of the colonial authorities. However, with the attainment of independence in 1960, the character of vigilante groups changed from those established to promote community interests to those that now served the interests of the dominant party in the three regions of the country. For example, in the Western Region, the night guards and other informal policing groups, especially in Ibadan, the seat of the regional government, became instruments of political intimidation and harassment of perceived political opponents by the Akintola-led government, until the fall of the Republic on January 15th, 1966.36 Indeed, for the complementary roles that these vigilante groups played, especially in the Western Region, in instigating the collapse of the first republic, the new military regime, upon assuming power, did not only suppress the politicized vigilante groups but also guillotined their authority to vigilantism. Although, in the 1970s, due to the oil boom which led to rising incidence of armed robbery and other allied crimes, there were increasing proliferation of neighbourhood watches and guard companies, the dispositions of the military regimes that superintended the country during the period, towards vigilante groups appeared not have changed. But, by the mid 1980s, the volte 31L. Fourchard, “The Politics of Mobilization for Security in South African Townships,” African AffairsVolume 110, No. 441 (2011) 32ibid. 33ibid. 34R. Watson,Civil Disorder is the Disease of Ibadan, Chieftaincy and Civic Culture in a Yoruba City(Oxford: James Currey, 2003), p.76. 35L. Fourchard, “The Politics of Mobilization for Security in South African Townships...; K. Rotimi, The Police in a Federal State: The Nigerian Experience (Ibadan: College Press, 2011).
EARLIER¶30-35
7 Till date, this is the title of the paramount ruler of the Ijebu Kingdom. 186 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 guards and other informal policing groups, especially in Ibadan, the seat of the regional government, became instruments of political intimidation and harassment of perceived political opponents by the Akintola-led government, until the fall of the Republic on January 15th, 1966 (Rotimi, 2001, 140; Fourchard, 2011, 17). Indeed, for the complementary roles that these vigilante groups played, especially in the Western Region, in instigating the collapse of the first republic, the new military regime, upon assuming power, did not only suppress the politicized vigilante groups but also guillotined their authority to vigilantism. Although, in the 1970s, due to the oil boom which led to rising incidence of armed robbery and other allied crimes, there were increasing proliferation of neighbourhood watches and guard companies, the dispositions of the military regimes that superintended the country during the period, towards vigilante groups appeared not have changed. But, by mid the 1980s, the volte face attitude of the military juntas towards vigilantes and other informal policing groups in the country changed. On why this changed attitude should not detain us here as there are abundant of studies (see Fabiyi, 2004; Fourchard, 2011). Specifically, in 1986, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, through its representatives at the state levels, in order to improve the battered image of the Nigerian Police Force, formally embraced vigilante groups as part of the country’s policing structure. In April 1987, in Oyo State, the Military Governor, Col. Adetunji Olurin, by virtue of the Mobilization Community Development Committee Edict (1987), gave legal backing to vigilantism in the state when he officially launched vigilante groups (OYSG, 1987). Legitimizing vigilantism, the Governor had said, ‘unlike the previous vigilante groups, the activities of the groups being inaugurated were protected by the law’ (see Tribune, 07/04/87). With such terse statement coming from a key member of a military junta, the environment of vigilantism in the country would appear to have changed, whereupon, the number of groups engaged in vigilantism, across the country increased. Interestingly, it was, perhaps, this legacy of government’s tacit support for vigilante groups that snowballed into the fourth republic that commenced on May 29th, 1999. 187 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 Vigilante Groups and Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Nigeria On the 29th May, 1999, Nigeria joined the league of electoral democracies. Prior to this date, the country had suffocated under various autocratic regimes that repressed, suppressed and denied the people of their democratic rights (Ojo 2004, 154). As the newly elected President, Olusegun Obasanjo (1999), in his inaugural speech, put it:
LATER¶39-44
31L. Fourchard, “The Politics of Mobilization for Security in South African Townships,” African AffairsVolume 110, No. 441 (2011) 32ibid. 33ibid. 34R. Watson,Civil Disorder is the Disease of Ibadan, Chieftaincy and Civic Culture in a Yoruba City(Oxford: James Currey, 2003), p.76. 35L. Fourchard, “The Politics of Mobilization for Security in South African Townships...; K. Rotimi, The Police in a Federal State: The Nigerian Experience (Ibadan: College Press, 2011). 36ibid., p. 140. Vigilantism and Policing In Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, 1987 – 1999 Page | 26 face attitude of the military juntas towards vigilantes and other informal policing groups in the country changed. On why this changed attitude should not detain us here as there are abundant of studies to that effect.37 Specifically, in 1986, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, through its representatives at the state levels, in order to improve the battered image of the Nigerian Police Force, formally embraced vigilante groups as part of the country’s policing structure. In April 1987, in Oyo State, the Military Governor, Col. Adetunji Olurin, by virtue of the Mobilization Community Development Committee Edict (1987), gave legal backing to vigilantism in the state when he officially launched vigilante groups (OYSG, 1987). Legitimizing vigilantism, the Governor had said, ‘unlike the previous vigilante groups, the activities of the groups being inaugurated were protected by the law.’38 With such terse statement coming from a key member of a military junta, the environment of vigilantism in the country would appear to have changed, whereupon, the number of groups engaged in vigilantism, across the country increased. Interestingly, it was, perhaps, this legacy of government’s tacit support for vigilante groups that snowballed into the fourth republic that commenced on May 29th, 1999. 3.1 Origin and Development of Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups in Akwa Ibom State Akwa Ibom State is located at the southeastern part of Nigeria. It is bounded by Cross River State on the east, by the Gulf of Guinea on the south, by Rivers State on the west, by Abia State on the north.39Its major cities include Uyo (the state capital), Eket, Ikot Abasi, Ikot-Ekpene, and Oron.40Akwa Ibom State is divided into thirty-one (31) local government political units, also referred to as local government areas (LGAs); these are: Abak, Eastern Obolo, Eket, Esit Eket, Essien Udim, Etim Ekpo, Etinan, Ibeno, Ibesikpo-Asutan, Ibiono-Ibom, Ika, Ikono, Ikot Ekpene, Ikot-Abasi, Ini, Itu, Mbo, Mkpat-Enin, Nsit-Atai, Nsit-Ibom, Nsit-Ubium, Obot-Akara, Okobo, Onna, Oron, OrukAnam, UdungUko, Ukanafun, Uruan, Urue-Offong/Oruko and Uyo.41 Long before the institutionalization of constitutional-oriented security agencies, communities scattered across the length and breadth of Akwa Ibom area had devised means of keepingtheir communities safe, especially from sporadic crimes and criminality. Some of these strategic methods have been described either as “hunter-guards system, or the night guard system,” which had its roots in the socio-cultural fabric of the Ibibio society.42However, as colonial rule sets in, both – night guard and hunter-guards – systems came to be known as vigilantism. The history of vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State is embedded in the trajectories of the people’s sociocultural and political histories, which span several decades before 1987, which is the originating chronology for this research.
EARLIER¶8-12
4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. 181 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 However, in spite of their growing numbers and seeming popularity, especially since the return of democracy in 1999, issues are constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing, against the background of their penchants for wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings (see Amnesty International, 2002; HRW/ CLEEN, 2002). To this end, there have been increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. In addition, in contemporary times the country is battling its worst level of insecurity since the civil war, which ended in 1970. It is against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Nigeria’s policing environment since the return of democracy in 1999. What have been their roles in post-authoritarian Nigeria? In discharging these roles, have they really constituted themselves as security threats to the country fledgling democracy? Specifically, this article engages these questions within the framework of the objective of the study. In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study’s purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country’s security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions. Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing, 182 Vigilante groups and policing in a democratizing Nigeria: navigating... Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199
LATER¶39-43
31L. Fourchard, “The Politics of Mobilization for Security in South African Townships,” African AffairsVolume 110, No. 441 (2011) 32ibid. 33ibid. 34R. Watson,Civil Disorder is the Disease of Ibadan, Chieftaincy and Civic Culture in a Yoruba City(Oxford: James Currey, 2003), p.76. 35L. Fourchard, “The Politics of Mobilization for Security in South African Townships...; K. Rotimi, The Police in a Federal State: The Nigerian Experience (Ibadan: College Press, 2011). 36ibid., p. 140. Vigilantism and Policing In Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, 1987 – 1999 Page | 26 face attitude of the military juntas towards vigilantes and other informal policing groups in the country changed. On why this changed attitude should not detain us here as there are abundant of studies to that effect.37 Specifically, in 1986, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, through its representatives at the state levels, in order to improve the battered image of the Nigerian Police Force, formally embraced vigilante groups as part of the country’s policing structure. In April 1987, in Oyo State, the Military Governor, Col. Adetunji Olurin, by virtue of the Mobilization Community Development Committee Edict (1987), gave legal backing to vigilantism in the state when he officially launched vigilante groups (OYSG, 1987). Legitimizing vigilantism, the Governor had said, ‘unlike the previous vigilante groups, the activities of the groups being inaugurated were protected by the law.’38 With such terse statement coming from a key member of a military junta, the environment of vigilantism in the country would appear to have changed, whereupon, the number of groups engaged in vigilantism, across the country increased. Interestingly, it was, perhaps, this legacy of government’s tacit support for vigilante groups that snowballed into the fourth republic that commenced on May 29th, 1999. 3.1 Origin and Development of Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups in Akwa Ibom State Akwa Ibom State is located at the southeastern part of Nigeria. It is bounded by Cross River State on the east, by the Gulf of Guinea on the south, by Rivers State on the west, by Abia State on the north.39Its major cities include Uyo (the state capital), Eket, Ikot Abasi, Ikot-Ekpene, and Oron.40Akwa Ibom State is divided into thirty-one (31) local government political units, also referred to as local government areas (LGAs); these are: Abak, Eastern Obolo, Eket, Esit Eket, Essien Udim, Etim Ekpo, Etinan, Ibeno, Ibesikpo-Asutan, Ibiono-Ibom, Ika, Ikono, Ikot Ekpene, Ikot-Abasi, Ini, Itu, Mbo, Mkpat-Enin, Nsit-Atai, Nsit-Ibom, Nsit-Ubium, Obot-Akara, Okobo, Onna, Oron, OrukAnam, UdungUko, Ukanafun, Uruan, Urue-Offong/Oruko and Uyo.41
EARLIER¶7-11
3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. 4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. 181 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 However, in spite of their growing numbers and seeming popularity, especially since the return of democracy in 1999, issues are constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing, against the background of their penchants for wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings (see Amnesty International, 2002; HRW/ CLEEN, 2002). To this end, there have been increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. In addition, in contemporary times the country is battling its worst level of insecurity since the civil war, which ended in 1970. It is against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Nigeria’s policing environment since the return of democracy in 1999. What have been their roles in post-authoritarian Nigeria? In discharging these roles, have they really constituted themselves as security threats to the country fledgling democracy? Specifically, this article engages these questions within the framework of the objective of the study. In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study’s purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country’s security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions. Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing,
LATER¶65-69
6. Strategies Used by Vigilante in Provision of Security The method used by vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State usually included surveillance of buildings and potential criminal persons. This method offered motorized patrols and foot patrols, including road and border patrols, to the police. This was the best way to collect intelligence from criminals. After 1999, this method was further utilized. Another strategy is cultivation of information since information is essential to all functional police activity. Intellectual ability reports on criminal individuals and associate recipients of loots were constantly collected. The cultivation of information is an essential part of police duties and this was achieved through the creation of relationships with members of the public with good intent to assist the police, police guards and victims of criminal activities, each investigation had a moral, professional and ethical obligation to protect the identity of informants.60 6.1 Challenges of the Strategies Used by Vigilante Groups These challenges include their faulty association with police and legal system; their legitimacy in the view of the communities they want to serve; recruitment and retention management; choice of appropriate operations and maintenance of resources, incentives and motivations to survive groups. Other challenges include inadequate government funding, police harassment in the performance of their tasks, lack of appropriate training and weapons, lack of basic operating equipment such as lamps, warm clothing, rain boots, rain coats, identity cards and whistles and uniforms, amongst others. Other weaknesses experienced by groups include poor monitoring of the new members and the presence of touts or “bad eggs” among the alert members, a wide range of institutions, and poor group accountability. It was these “bad eggs” with criminal intention that gave vigilante groups a bad image in the eyes of the government, the police and the people living in the communities they operated. Most of the vigilante groups faced criticism in terms of their penchants for lawlessness, wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings. In view of this, the government of Akwa Ibom refused to pass into law the bill that gave them the legitimacy to operate. One important problem of vigilante between 1987 and 1999 was their tendency to turn from good to bad and threaten the peace and stability of their communities of operation. Also, the problems between it group usually led to splinter group, as was seen in the case of MOSSOP, which led to its proliferation. 6.2 Impact on Akwa Ibom State The impact of vigilantism in communities in Akwa Ibom State was relative and differed from community to community,and the strategies adopted by different vigilante groups; while some of them were lofty other were short of expectation, or detrimental: On a more general note, the activities of the vigilante groups recorded the following impact: i. Due to the insufficient police force in the State to carry out their functions, the vigilante group and Neighbourhood Watch were introduced to assist in meeting this demand, and one of such demands was the protection of lives and properties. This function on the part of the vigilante group was very necessary, given the importance attached to human lives, and, much more importantly, their properties must be protected. The Akwa Ibom State vigilante group was functioning in protecting the lives of people living in the State and their properties.61 ii. Vigilante Group Maintained Peace and Order: This aspect of function was attached to the vigilante group. It was expected of it to maintain peace and order within society. For instance, anytime there
EARLIER¶0-3
179 Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 VIGILANTE GROUPS AND POLICING IN A DEMOCRATIZING NIGERIA: NAVIGATING THE CONTEXT AND ISSUES Adeniyi S. Basiru1 Olusesan A. Osunkoya2 Introduction Before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria, the various indigenous communities, like elsewhere in Africa, had evolved various self-help institutions (vigilante groups in modern sense) for maintaining public order. But, with the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management, that had for centuries served the people, were relegated to the background, as the modern police force, the precursor of the present day Nigerian Police, under the direction of the colonial authorities, became the primus inter pares, in the internal security architecture of the colony (Ahire, 1991, 18). With this development, the communal/collectivist-oriented frameworks of policing that had for centuries been part of people’s social existence now constituted the informal models of policing rendering subsidiary roles. For decades, this was the arrangement for policing the vast Nigerian territory. Although, there were documented cases of police re-organizations, by the colonial authorities, in Lagos, in 1930 and 1954 (Akuul, 2011, 18), these, however, neither reversed the western-dominated order of policing nor re-organized the indigenous informal models of policing. Put differently, the indigenous police institutions, in differently parts of the country, continued to play subsidiary roles in public order management. Instructively, at independence, the colonial arrangement rather than being transformed to reflect 1 Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria. E-mail: asbash72@ yahoo.com 2 Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijagun, Nigeria. E-mail: osunkoyaoa@tasued.edu.ng
LATER¶70-72
60Felix Uyanna, 42 Years, Former Commissioner of Police, Akwa Ibom State Police Headquarter, Ikot Akpan Abia, No 161 Aka Etinan Rd, Uyo 61ibid. Vigilantism and Policing In Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, 1987 – 1999 Page | 30 were social functions or public functions, the services of the vigilante group were employed to assist in ensuring that, peace and order were maintained in order to guarantee the success of such event particularly, those recruited by the government.62 iii. Vigilante Group Assisted in Combating Crimes: This was another function of the vigilante group they assisted in fighting crimes in the Akwa Ibom State, particularly, in the night. During the nighthours, thevigilantegroups organized itself and go for patrolling for the purpose of ensuring that any robbery attempt is averted. By so doing villagers, whose family members of the vigilante group were among was being protected from robbery attack. iv. Vigilante Group Arrested Crime Offenders: The vigilante groups did not only prevent crimes, they could go as well as arresting any individual caught committing crime, because crime commission was invariably the same thing as encroaching or infringing the rights of the members of the public, and when caught by the group, the person was arrested by the vigilante group, and handed over to police for prosecution. v. Vigilante Groups handed over Everything Recovered during Operation to the Relevant Authority: Anything recovered during operations by the vigilante group in Akwa Ibom State was returned tothe appropriate quarters (i.e., Police Stations), nothing recovered was expected to remain in the custody of the vigilante groups. Therefore, it was one of the major functions of the vigilante group to return all exhibits to help in further investigation purposes. 7. Conclusion The paper examines the role of the vigilante groups as an aspect of community policing in Akwa Ibom State. It was observed that, long before the institutionalization of constitutional-oriented security agencies, communities scattered across the length and breadth of Akwa Ibom area had devised means of keeping their communities safe, especially from sporadic crimes and criminality. With the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management were relegated to the background. This situation continued even after Nigeria gained independence. It also noted that high crime level between 1987 and 1999 was the main motivation behind people taking the law into their own hands. Several reasons gave rise to vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State. These reasons range from insecurity, unemployment and idleness, corruption within the police service, youth empowerment to political reasons, corrupt and ineffective judicial justice systems, mistrust on the prosecution systems, easy or lenient bail conditions for the suspects and frustrations about rising criminal activities. The method used by vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State usually included surveillance of buildings and potential criminal persons. This method offered motorized patrols and foot patrols, including road and border patrols, to the police. The study observed that the “bad eggs” syndrome affected vigilante groups which along with their penchants for lawlessness, wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings gave them many of their criticism. In the course of this research, few challenges were encountered, ranging from logistical issues which affected the overall process of managing available resources, documentation, and transportation to methodological issues. Conducting oral interviews with members of vigilante groups and other security agencies constituted some of the prevailing challenges as the people to be interviewed were not readily accessible or available. Some of the valuable documents needed for the research were highly classified which also affected the accessibility and profundity of information which would have added value to the research. With this, information for the study relied on solely on oral and secondary sources. It is suggested that future researchers may consider more written primary sources as this help to overcome the issues of reliability and objectivity. Also, future researchers may also consider the role of vigilantism in proliferation of small and light weapons in Akwa Ibom State and specific areas of the State.
EARLIER¶7-11
3 For instance, the special crime fighting outfit, Rapid Response Squad (RRS), since the return of democracy in 1999 has been funded by Lagos State Government. 4 For example, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, on June 6, 2013, promulgated the State Vigilante Service Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups. 181 Adeniyi S. Basiru and Olusesan A. Osunkoya Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 4, n. 8, Jul./Dec. 2019 | p. 179-199 However, in spite of their growing numbers and seeming popularity, especially since the return of democracy in 1999, issues are constantly being raised regarding whether they could really be agents of democratic policing, against the background of their penchants for wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings (see Amnesty International, 2002; HRW/ CLEEN, 2002). To this end, there have been increasing concerns in policy and academic circles if vigilante groups are not themselves threats to the security not only of the communities where they operate but the country as a whole. In addition, in contemporary times the country is battling its worst level of insecurity since the civil war, which ended in 1970. It is against this background this article examines the place of vigilante groups in Nigeria’s policing environment since the return of democracy in 1999. What have been their roles in post-authoritarian Nigeria? In discharging these roles, have they really constituted themselves as security threats to the country fledgling democracy? Specifically, this article engages these questions within the framework of the objective of the study. In terms of organization, the article is partitioned into six sections, starting with an introduction pointing to the study’s purpose, significance and rationale. Section two presents the conceptual framework that guides the discourse in the article. The third section, in a retrospective fashion, looks at the evolution of vigilante groups in Nigeria. The aim here is to lay bare the dynamism of vigilante groups in modern Nigeria. Section four critically examines the roles of vigilantes and other informal policing groups in public order management in the post-1999 era, with illustration of two cases. In section this follows, the performance of vigilante groups in contemporary era are assessed in the context of the country’s security environment. Section six rounds up with a few submissions. Policing, Police, Vigilantism and Vigilante Groups: A Conceptual Discourse Frankly speaking, the four concepts that are central to this article, policing, police, vigilantism and vigilante groups, indeed, like their peers in security studies cannot be pinned down to one specific definition as they conjure different meanings. In other words, they are, to borrow Gallie’s (1962) elegant phrase, essentially contested concepts. To this end, the approach that is adopted in this article is to conceptualize and discuss their meanings from the perspective of the nexus connecting them. Firstly, the concept of policing,
LATER¶70-72
60Felix Uyanna, 42 Years, Former Commissioner of Police, Akwa Ibom State Police Headquarter, Ikot Akpan Abia, No 161 Aka Etinan Rd, Uyo 61ibid. Vigilantism and Policing In Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, 1987 – 1999 Page | 30 were social functions or public functions, the services of the vigilante group were employed to assist in ensuring that, peace and order were maintained in order to guarantee the success of such event particularly, those recruited by the government.62 iii. Vigilante Group Assisted in Combating Crimes: This was another function of the vigilante group they assisted in fighting crimes in the Akwa Ibom State, particularly, in the night. During the nighthours, thevigilantegroups organized itself and go for patrolling for the purpose of ensuring that any robbery attempt is averted. By so doing villagers, whose family members of the vigilante group were among was being protected from robbery attack. iv. Vigilante Group Arrested Crime Offenders: The vigilante groups did not only prevent crimes, they could go as well as arresting any individual caught committing crime, because crime commission was invariably the same thing as encroaching or infringing the rights of the members of the public, and when caught by the group, the person was arrested by the vigilante group, and handed over to police for prosecution. v. Vigilante Groups handed over Everything Recovered during Operation to the Relevant Authority: Anything recovered during operations by the vigilante group in Akwa Ibom State was returned tothe appropriate quarters (i.e., Police Stations), nothing recovered was expected to remain in the custody of the vigilante groups. Therefore, it was one of the major functions of the vigilante group to return all exhibits to help in further investigation purposes. 7. Conclusion The paper examines the role of the vigilante groups as an aspect of community policing in Akwa Ibom State. It was observed that, long before the institutionalization of constitutional-oriented security agencies, communities scattered across the length and breadth of Akwa Ibom area had devised means of keeping their communities safe, especially from sporadic crimes and criminality. With the emergence of the colonial state and all its coercive paraphernalia, these traditional institutions of public order management were relegated to the background. This situation continued even after Nigeria gained independence. It also noted that high crime level between 1987 and 1999 was the main motivation behind people taking the law into their own hands. Several reasons gave rise to vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State. These reasons range from insecurity, unemployment and idleness, corruption within the police service, youth empowerment to political reasons, corrupt and ineffective judicial justice systems, mistrust on the prosecution systems, easy or lenient bail conditions for the suspects and frustrations about rising criminal activities. The method used by vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom State usually included surveillance of buildings and potential criminal persons. This method offered motorized patrols and foot patrols, including road and border patrols, to the police. The study observed that the “bad eggs” syndrome affected vigilante groups which along with their penchants for lawlessness, wanton violence, human rights violations and extra-judicial killings gave them many of their criticism. In the course of this research, few challenges were encountered, ranging from logistical issues which affected the overall process of managing available resources, documentation, and transportation to methodological issues. Conducting oral interviews with members of vigilante groups and other security agencies constituted some of the prevailing challenges as the people to be interviewed were not readily accessible or available. Some of the valuable documents needed for the research were highly classified which also affected the accessibility and profundity of information which would have added value to the research. With this, information for the study relied on solely on oral and secondary sources. It is suggested that future researchers may consider more written primary sources as this help to overcome the issues of reliability and objectivity. Also, future researchers may also consider the role of vigilantism in proliferation of small and light weapons in Akwa Ibom State and specific areas of the State.